

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Mike Cirillo,

Type: Interview

Date: March 30, 2004

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared By: Lisa Sullivan

Team: 8

Participants (non-Commission): David Wiegand and Mike Cirillo

Participants (Commission): John Farmer, Lisa Sullivan, John Azzarello, and Dana Hyde

Location: FAA HDQTs

In 1977 Mike Cirillo joined Air Force controller, Joined FAA in 1981; headquarters – requirements – managed some facilities – came back to headquarters in procedures in 1996 – interfaced with requirements and air traffic planning – he managed – 1999 went to DFS liaison in Germany – returned to the HDQTs as an executive for Requirements office: sets the requirements for new air traffic control equipment – displays and automation and traffic flow management systems – operational systems – did that for 8 months program director for air traffic procedures since then – and he is still doing that Duties: responsible for air traf procedures – the handbooks that dictate atc services for the controllers supers and managers - Flight service terminal and enroute and planning – works with acquisition group – advanced route and navigational performance

Recently there is a new flight standards driven what an aircraft will do a common strategy that is how an aircraft pilot responds to the hijack – subtle changes even since 9-11. “the controllers expectation and his sense of what may be suspicious and what is not.”

The week after 9-11 there were changes sent to the field such things as be mindful of transponders turned off – the notice was sent out from his office and it was to alert controllers about suspicious activity despite the commonness of a transponder turned off. Determined it a suspicious activity. That notice was an interim basis then becomes an order – some changes post-9-11

For controller standpoint the supervisor has a new chain of events – the controllers notification to the super is the same.

Paper situation – 7610 – what the controllers would do?

What was relevant just to supervisors? There was a document – he is not absolutely sure of that – management functions –

The protocol on 9-10 for controller: form 7110.65 it hadn't been modified relative to hijacking for many years

Emergency binder at each facility – that was the reference point all in compliance with national directive -

Post 9-11: Notice: Suspicious activity captured the idea that electrical or transponder issues - this notice has been modified two or three times since its issue about notification and is currently mandated.

In terms of emergency procedures post 9-11 was there a universal handbook sent out? There may have been additional training refresher training the curriculum was changed a bit –

The Procedures Office – deals only with the controllers (not the planes) he was the head of the office for two months before 9-11 he is transitioning to ATC for the procedures of the terminal environment – the office works on classified projects – around Cuba or State Dept - with ATP 200 Mr. Van Stienburgen – did presidential movement – that was VST's job.

Systems operations – Linda Schuessler heads up handles things that cross domains

Changes to 7110: can you tell me about the discussion after 9-11 – the discussion centered around what a controller should have expected before and after 9-11. what is normal and what is not had changed. Air traffic doesn't do intel doesn't do threats – we wanted to take that away from them – one thing was to leave the level of interpret out of the air traffic hand –

NOTIFICATIONS:

Prior to 9-11 the notification procedure was the fac would notify the region – the ops center was a counterpart to the wash center – they would make additional notifications- now there is a stricter protocol – the controller to super to ops manager to the roc the roc contacted (not absolutely sure) one call was to WOC – the WOC would contact NORAD – the facilities sometimes take their own initiative – that was not the documented procedure –

Coordination with interested parties = people that would respond would get the first notification- ATP 200 has a liaison at NORAD – Cheryl Atkins is a liaison for DOD at FAA

9-11- NEADS has Steve Culbertson who is FAA

On 9-11

That morning in a staff meeting – went to 10th floor the conference room 1002 we were told an aircraft had hit the WTC. As he walked in there he says it as he walked in the second plane hit. Jeff Griffith acting director of air traffic at the time – Dave Canoles – Sabra came in at one point. A group of people up there put the telcon up the DEN Nelson Garabido was on the phone from the WH JOC he is secret service

Direction from Jeff to set up the telcon - heard an aircraft was missing weren't sure obviously they needed to conference the right people – the list of participants was decided "he's not sure" the regions and trying to figure out to conference the centers – eventually everyone needs to be on it to land all the aircrafts. The information was coming from Dulles about the eastbound plane coming straight for them.

Nancy was standing there relaying information from the telcon to him. The telcon Dave Canoles we were contacting people to be on the telcon he left the room and that was when the aircraft came around trying to find out the information the position of the aircraft someone yelled there is smoke from the pentagon

When he came in Canoles did seem to be running that telcon when he came back in after the Pentagon crash.

He does not know how he came to take the call from Nelson –

Terry was not on the 10th – he was on the 6th floor.

Nelson had called Jeff's office and he wasn't there so Cirillo took the call.

He saw at 9:03 the same plane hitting. 9:15 he established contact with Garabido. Somewhere there was a conference with the Administrator. Jeff went down to discuss with them. In the WOC. Or the SIVITS.

Nelson: counting down the position of the aircraft with him. Asked him about aircraft activity in the area. There was conversation about shutting down the system. He had heard that there was no arrival or departure happening. He relayed that to Nelson. There was a lot of activity on his end. He was on the telcon talking to Terry and also on the SIVITS. Terry's conversation with Nelson was not a telcon. He did not go to SIVITS at any point. Cirillo was not receiving any information from other sources

Nelson heard of specific information of aircraft in bound to DC after 77. There were so many phantom ideas about positions of aircraft – the phantoms were due to miscommunications – convoluted so quickly. He thinks that is what happened. The crash in Kentucky was a perfect example of that - the flurry activity around that – he doesn't recall other planes like 77. The plane that crashed in 'Penn. There were planes over the Pacific he recalls –

Orchestrating all the planes that needed to be landed. Safe orderly flow of airtraffic – a lot of raw information coming in

Recollection of ual 93:

The position reporting – he recollects the C-130 that confirmed the crash or something. There was a lot of speculation as to how the plane crashed. A lot of speculation – Reported on the telcon that it was

There was an aircraft missing that was southbound heading toward DC. Assumed heading to dc. That is the extent of what he remembers. The appropriate notifications would be made by the appropriate people. Fairly certain the notifications were made. HDQTS has a responsibility would have been responsibility – Atkins was in the room – sometime Griffith and I confided all the military liaisons to see what they have and what they knew – the conference time he is unclear of and they had it again a few times. We were trying to get information from them about the scrambles anything FAA could do to support – the FAA has fairly high level connections within the military facilities. He and Jeff Griffith – it was after the phone with Nelson – it was shortly after Penatog crash he hung up from Nelson – conveying information to Nelson about UAL 93 they did not talk about that –

NEADS (at some point that day) it was evacuated that day –

Conference with the military liaisons DOD was in the sky rather than civilian – the role of the controllers what does the DOD need and want – lifeguard flights and LE was also up – order was needed – a gradual return of other planes – the telcon facilitated the modified scenario that was in place. ATC had full control never completely scenario.

Telcon NMCC pentagon call? Doesn't recall hearing about it?

Liaison to NORAD was Reggie Settles on 9-11. He wasn't there that day. A military reimbursable. Telcon that was lead for the ACC that involved the agencies including SS. It occurred maybe that day. That was in parallel as the other conferences. Reggie was on the conference and the other liaisons – that was the command center (lead out there – it is possible it was Lee Longmire's telcon – the purpose of that telcon was traffic flow management – the CC is the brain of FAA operations – the contingency plan is executed out there – scripts for the facilities – the orchestrator. Whereas his work is overhead develop procedures implement procedures... whereas the CC is more day to day.

Canoles telcon was a policy telcon. The first 15-20 minutes of the day are hard to focus on – that appropriate policy level coordination was done on the canoles but the working of the planes and the operational ones were on the CC - both served the same function and were redundancy but also a good source of communication

Jack Kees and HDQTS was high level communication -

Military needed to know what was going on and the FAA was the only source of it – how did they get the info –

Cheryl Atkins did a lot for coordination for the FAA that was not on the tac movement of aircraft. So coor for scatana at that level that would have happened with Monte Belger. At some point later he and Eberhardt had that discussion , then grades downward, the policy decisions are less critical the DOD was on both telcons and what level of discussion was going – our liaisons did end up getting on that telcon -

When that telcon came into being; he's not sure ;

After he hung up with nelson, he did not speak to SS again. That conversation was the countdown to 77. Terry was also on the phone with them and also SS was on the SIVITS. Any direct comms to the WH? No.

He knew Nelson because of Presidential Movement. Nelson had called Jeff Grithiths to find out what was going on? There wasn't a specific question about a specific flight. There job is protection and that was foremost in his mind. He doesn't remember talk with him of scrambling... others were speculating about the DOD's response time – the group in the room – what is the DOD response? What to expect? Where are the assets? Was anyone speaking to the NMCC? Someone did, but not sure who or where. Because WOC is responsible for that conversation it goes througj there.

He was just on the phone when he started to hear about 77 and then began briefing him on that.

It is hard for me to frame the actual times in his mind.

Liaisons were trying to get information. Officers in the command at those sights because the generals can not be on the phones. They had pretty free reign of access – since on that day wer were looking for information from them rather than relaying the Canoles telcon information to the liaisons.

When and if an aircraft would intercept another – there were so many issues with DOD that day. Had to come up with procedures to deal with an interceptor at very close range. The first day orchrestrating the dod movement. Needs and expectations. In the mean time, the phantom situations – Korean Air into Alaska communication was going about those events.

Dana: Coordination seems to be missing from the morning – FAA NMCC and or FAA DOD –

Cirillo: Seems as though you are deemphasize of Cheryl Atkins (FAA liaison to the USAF). She and the other liaisons: “all of them were up there almost immediately and coordinating manically.” From his level, and the people he coordinates with, they were right there and in lock step. For a fact she coordinated with Norad specifically. At least

from the Director of AT level. Doesn't know what coordination consisted of and UAL 93.

She is still here - and retiring soon

He didn't play a role in grounding the aircraft none of the telcons had a role in that - he was not involved in communicating that -

Lessons learned - the huge impact aviation has on the country - he took for granted the impact aviation has on the society. We all play a role by virtue of the stewardship of the air traffic - the enormity of supporting Law Enforcement - it is significant -

Transponders are required for enroute centers and therefore only secondary radar is all that is necessary - primary radars are very expensive to retain. Civilian aviation does not need them - it is military need -