

**9/11 Commission files**

**Team 8/ Box 6**

**FA HQ – Monte Belger, 20<sup>th</sup> April 2004**

Scanned by Mike Williams of 911myths.com on 3rd March 2009

Book #9

4/20/04

4/20/04 Interview with Monte Belzer

- D.H.
- M.K.
- G. Brown
- Brooke Lewis FAA Counsel.

- Interviewees' access to Toppo -  
DoJ - Dan Levin has copies of Toppo.
- 30 yrs. w/ FAA
- 1972 - Started as Entry Level Security Assoc.  
ANE - Security  
AGL - Security
- 1980 - AGL - Dir. mgr. in  
FAA Airport Program
- AGL Dep. Director Region
- 1988 - FAA - HQ Associate Director  
Associate Admin.
- 1997 - FAA HQ - Acting Deputy  
Administrator
- Retired in 9/02.

- Scope of Responsibility → Dep. Admin.
  - Assisted Doney in all matters.
  - All FAA Programs came under his review.
  - He was never confirmed as Deputy Administrator.
  - Highest ranking AT person under him - Steve Brown ATIS -
  - Highest ranking <sup>Civil Aviation</sup> Security person under him - General Canavan -  
     - Lynne ~~born~~ Osmos, Dep. Director.
- 

## Summer of 2001

- He was aware of IC<sup>15</sup> that FAA sent out.
- He remembers Admiral Flynn raised concerns.

— He was aware of what was in the news.

— aware of "Al Qaeda" as a potential threat pre 9-11.

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— Summer 2001 → threats focused on U.S. interests abroad.

~~Domestic~~

— Hijack information was focused on foreign countries.

\* — Domestic Hijacks → <sup>potential was still</sup> based on traditional model.

— no recall of specific briefing focused on a heightened threat level.

— He talked to the security folks all the time.

— When hijack threats were mentioned in IC<sup>15</sup>, it was in the context of overseas hijackings.

— He did not have to sign off on IC<sup>15</sup>.



- Security Division met with Belzer's staff 3x each week.
- ~~When~~ He never got the sense that the FAA should heighten security nor were they told to do so.
- 8/6/01 PDB - people in U.S. taking actions consistent w/ hijackings. → ~~He had the~~  
     ↓  
 - Belzer never heard this.
- If he rec'd the information, he does not know what they may have done.
- Historically, the FAA had taken actions to tighten the system if given specific information.
- He does not think Jarvey knew about the 8/6/01 PDB.
- If they had ~~PDB~~ P.D.B. Info, FAA and all law enforcement agencies probably would have

bonded together to discuss possible reactions / actions.

— July <sup>2001</sup> ~~for~~ WH mtg - CSG - Regarding Terrorism threats TO U.S.

— He was familiar with CSG and Dick Clarke.

— He does not think he spoke TO Clarke pre 9-11.

— General Canavan (pre 9-11 - Admiral Flynn) would have met with CSG and Clarke re: Terrorism threats.

\* — To the extent hijack was mentioned, it was discussed in a traditional sense in the summer of 2001

— He is "honestly not sure" if the summer of 2001 threats were "heightened."

— After Pan Am 103 in 1988 -> probably a greater # of threats or hijacks

Summer  
of  
2001

— His reaction to 9/11 events was  
great surprise.

↓  
— They thought the threat was  
fundamentally focused overseas and  
that it would involve hostage  
taking etc.

— He does not remember the  
1993 Suvarna hijacking.

— Look at IC<sup>15</sup> (Information Circulars)

\* — Let's get the Circulars for 2001  
and look at them.

Summer  
of  
2001

\* Same mention of potential for terrorist  
activities → fundamentally focused  
overseas.

Summer  
2001 — He does not think the FAA  
had any information regarding  
threats that were not included in IC<sup>15</sup>.

— The FAA is sometimes prohibited  
from repeating intel. but he  
is not aware that this happened in  
the summer of 2001.

— He recalls a short briefing that Admiral Flynn gave him regarding a terrorist group. — (Flynn was replaced in early 2001).

— Hijack training / Exercises —  
pre 9-11.

\* — He does not remember a specific hijack testing or training at FAA HQ pre 9-11.

— Pre 9-11 → the management and response protocols b/w FAA, DoD and FBI were clear.

\* → He does not know if that specificity exists today.

— He does ~~not~~ say it would have been brought to his attention pre 9-11 if FAA HQ had a hijack training exercise.

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Why was the FAA the lead agency in a hijack situation pre 9-11?

- In the 1980's - there were instances where law enforcement took actions (e.g. shooting two of A/C) that put the A/C in jeopardy. - Safety of A/C is issue.

i.e. Law was passed that a hijacked A/C was an A/C in distress. Safety was an issue. While an A/C is in flight (starting when the cabin door is shut), the safety of the A/C is an FAA Administrator responsibility.

- DoD/FBI only got involved in hijack when FAA requested assistance.

- If a hijack unfolded, DoD would monitor the situation.

- Pre 9-11 → The system never contemplated DoD having a different role in response to a hijacking (e.g. shooting down A/C).

- 1976 - Croquet hijacking - from Chicago  
TO Canada TO London

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- Since 1970, FAA has had someone  
in charge of coordinating a hijack  
response.

- Hijack Coordinator - usually  
~~also~~ always a security person.

- He reviews FAA order 7610.4 Special  
Military Operations and says  
ACS-1, Canavan (or his  
Appointee) would be the hijack  
Coordinator.

↓  
It may fall to the senior person  
in ACS.

- ~~He~~ He would want ACI  
folks gathering intel. while  
the ACO folks coordinated  
the hijack response.

- He thinks Lee Langmeier was  
ACO-1 on 9/11.

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9/11/01

- Arrived Around 7 A.M.
- Typical day - Tues. AT mtg to discuss issues.
- During AT mtg, Griffith (J6) got a page / Call re: AIC had lost transponder contact, - no mention of a hijacking.
- Few minutes after WTC-1 Crash → headed to his office - S. Miller told him AIC hit WTC.
- He walked <sup>through</sup> ~~to~~ WOC Around 8:50 and right to ACC. - 8:55 AM.
- He had no knowledge of a hijacking in the system until after WTC-2 Crash.
- ~~So~~ He believes <sup>(not sure)</sup> Longmire was in WOC when he arrived. → Longmire briefed him, but no mention of hijack. <sup>he thinks</sup>
- They were watching T.V. and thinking WTC-1 Crash was maybe a small C/A aircraft.

- He was in ACC room for maybe 2 minutes and then went to his office.
- He probably <sup>called</sup> AT suites.
- Secy Minetta's office called him.
- \* - He was on the phone with John F. Fletcher when the 2<sup>nd</sup> A/C hit WTC.
- He talked to "a million" A.T. people on 9-11.
- He talked to Fletcher, Minetta, Harvey, Michael Jackson and others.
- The only thing he learned in ACC room ~~for~~ while there for 2 min. was that an A/C hit WTC.
- After 2<sup>nd</sup> WTC Crash - he went back to WOC Area and learned more about events.
  - ↳ Harvey was on her way back to FAA.



- He went back to WOC / ACC after he learned of WTC-2 crash.
  - ↳ He talked to people and learned about potential of L hijacking.
- They started getting reports about other A/C that may have been in distress.
- They tried to sort through fact and fiction.
- He recalls Fongmire (senior person) running the Net.
  - ↳ He assumed Fongmire had the net up.
- People in and out of WOC, ACC and his office. He <sup>constantly</sup> threw extra people out of ACC / WOC area.
- "The Net"
  - Tactical Net → internal to FAA (What is going on? Do we need to bring in outside agencies)
  - Primary Net → FAA brings in other

- On 9/11 → he assumed FAA had the right people on "the net".

federal agencies."

- Post 9-11 he learned "the Tactical net" was established around 8:50 A.M. → he saw this on WOC logs.

- Post 9-11 → he believed Purway net was set up at 9:20 A.M. b/c he saw this in the WOC logs.

- ROC<sup>15</sup> would set up security nets and maybe A.T. net.

- He knew Canals and A.T. people were talking to CC at Henderson and FAA field facilities getting specific A.T. information.

- He did not go down to Canals A.T. suite until later in afternoon of 9/11.

- He says CC should have been tied into ACC room telecon.

- TSD was in the WOC on 9/11.  
↳ he saw it.

- Darvey / Belzer did not have a TSD.
- He is unaware if Griffith / ~~Procock~~ Procock had a TSD.
- After they decided to ground all A/C he and others looked at TSD to see how many A/C were left.
- He is relying on Constant Communication with A.T. people.
- He says Griffith is on phone with A.T. people in Suites with Consoles.  
     ↓  
     All or some of this A.T. Information could have been coming into the ACC.
- He remembers seeing a DoD person in the ACC room.
- He would have expected CC to have an open line with ACC and A.T. Suites.

— He assumes Griffith/Davis were in A.T. Suite when they were talking to CC John White.

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SVTS Topic — SVTS on 9-11 — Belge, Harvey, Griffith and Barnes would have been FAA reps. on line.

— CIA, FBI, DoD, USSS, DOT, etc were on SVTS. W.H. was on — R. Clarke  
Lisa LNU

— General Myers and Rumsfeld were not on SVTS with him.

— Pete Verga was on SVTS with him

— Prior to noon on 9/11 → he does not recall being on SVTS.

— He does not think he was on the SVTS prior to Pentagon strike.

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— He, Harvey and Griffiths (in some combination) were on SVTS that day.

— If Harvey was there → she gave info.

- Issues discussed:

- 1.) A/C still in NAS
- 2.) Any suspect A/C still in system
- 3.) Any threat information

- He gathered his information for SVTS from ACE, WOC, A.T. suites.

- Re UAL 93 → he does not remember any "real-time" discussions on the SVTS about any of the 4 hijacked A/C.

- He does not recall learning anything from SVTS about distressed A/C (on UAL 93 or AAL 77).

- He did not learn anything about scrambling from SVTS.

~~He did not learn anything from SVTS about scrambling.~~

- no recollection that scrambling of fighter A/C was discussed on SVTS.

- The SVTS meetings he participated in → recalls no information being discussed about UAL 93, AAL 77 or ~~the~~ scrambles of fighters A/C
- He gave information they had <sup>at the time</sup> on AAL 11 and UAL 175 to people on SVTS.
- He thinks they knew AAL 11 hit WTC-1 early on that day.
- Conversations with Minetta → Minetta called him - they (Belge, etc) gave Minetta, Flecherty or Mike Jackson ~~books~~ constant updates on separate calls. (no gen line).
- Generally he fielded Minetta's calls from his office or the WOC.
- Not aware of people other than him or Gorney speaking to Minetta.
- He talked to Minetta on 9/11 when Minetta was in the PEOC.  
↳ Does not think he knew Minetta

was ~~so~~ next to Cheney that morning.

- Minetta wanted to know who, what, where and when.

- Wanted updates on A/C that were suspected of being in jeopardy.

- recalls talk <sup>and concern</sup> about C. Kovan A/C ~~being~~ squawking hijack near Alaska Area.

\* - He does remember hearing about an A/C bearing down on W.H. at low altitude before Pentagon strike. - Does not recall talking to Minetta about this.

- He recalls <sup>FAA</sup> thinking that AAL 77 crashed and that state police confirmed this.

- 5 A/C of concern

② that hit WTC

① AAL 77 → that they thought had crashed

① UAL 93

① Unidentified A/C (Primary radar track identified by Dulles →

— Speculation was that it was a  
VFR A/C that was approaching D.C.

— A little before 9:30 A.M. FAA  
learned of problem with UAL 93.

— He thinks they knew about  
UAL 93 around 9:30 A.M. time  
frame.

— "We had 'dozens of ~~sit~~ reports'  
that came in that were as serious  
as UAL 93.

— He knew of the "call sign UAL 93"  
on the morning of 9-11.

↓  
~~He knew what everyone else~~

— He was getting reports of UAL 93 —  
~~they were~~

10 min: Break

— He wants to add information →  
at the time UAL 93 was in distress,  
he believes everyone was  
following UAL 93 including  
the military — (and the primary  
net was set up at 9:20 A.M.)



- SUTS calls he was on did not address ~~operational~~ tactical or operational issues.

2 - Bases for believing military was following UAL 93 -

① FAA knew F-16's were scrambled and over Washington Area → Belie's Langley was scrambled in response to AAL 77.

~~② The military was in the ACC room.~~

② He did not ask if the NMCC was on "the net" → but he assumed they were on the net.

- When an A/C<sup>VFR</sup> was reported approaching D.C. Region → this was his first indication that there was a threat to D.C. Area.

\* ① - 2 things he learned after 9-11 →  
① Several DoD interviewees made the point that several fighters were in position over D.C. Area should another A/C approach the Area. (implication was they were prepared for UAL 93 approach)

② His Question post 9-11 To his staff. → Did we give prompt notification on each of the 4 flights.

— FAA staff told him there was an open line = ~~not~~ Primary net and that NMCC was on it.

— Saw NORAD press release (9/18) said there was an open line discussing ~~AA~~ UAL 93.

— When the WOC calls other agencies into the Primary net, the WOC is supposed to log the contact.

— DOT was telling FAA to be very precise about what information (related to chronology of events / military notices) they released publicly.

— DOT wanted chronologies.

- He now says Langley scrambled in response to an unidentified A/C that later turned out to be AAL77.
  - He did not know the full of detail that would encompass AAL 11 being reborn.
- 

- He remembers getting information on UAL 93 - before it crashed.
- FAA was a little more ahead of the curve UAL 93.
- He did not check to see if military was getting information on UAL 93.
- He assumed that ACC people had UAL 93 information.
- It does not surprise him that FAA Summary does not include a notification time for UAL 93 b/c FAA believed the NMCC was on the Primary net.

- He does not believe DoD publicly stated they had no notice of UAL 93.

- Where is the Primary Net?

① - ~~Do~~ ask the WOC - for a log of when other agencies got on the Primary net.

② Ask ACS - people who was on the primary net on behalf of FAA?

③ - Ask other agencies when they got on the Primary net?

~~④ - Ask the FAA~~

- He was surprised that NORAD put out a 9/18/01 press release b/c DOJ told FAA to be careful ~~not~~.

- There is no record they <sup>FAA</sup> can point to that FAA ~~notified~~ ~~the~~ asked (NORAD) for military - all decisions <sub>NMCC</sub>

Assistance on UAL 93 or  
that they "pointed out UAL 93  
as a hijack" To the NMCC.

— Recommendations:

— ~~THE~~ FAA — NMCC

— ~~Is it~~ a mistake to transfer security  
Authority to TSA? → no opinion

— ~~Testimony before Congress~~ →

— May 2003 Pres. → NORAD  
said they did not have shoot  
down authority on UAL 93?

~~Does~~ Does the FAA have  
any information that indicates  
the NMCC / or other military  
Component ever rec'd this  
information (re: UAL 93)

11/24 Belgen interview

Belgen  
Comma w/  
NMCC  
ATC

Comma Bridges w/ NMCC NORAD CONR NEADS

Hypack Coordinator

Hunt for AA11

Peru  
0903 - 0937

Radar History

0938 - 1003

1003 - ?

Shutdown Authority

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Team 7 Memo to Ray Belgen

FAA Emp History

1972 entry level inspector TAMPA  
HQ Security staff

1978 NE Reg, Dir Mgr Security

1980-88 AGL HQ Sec Dir Mgr

1983-84 Airports Dir Mgr

1986 Dep Dir AGL

Sep 1988 Assoc Admin and Sec

Dec 1988 Asst Am IQ3

1988-2002 w HQ

last 5 acting Dep Admin  
relieved as acting admin Sep 13 2002

Jan 2003 - Pres Lockheed Martin

Period up to 9/11 strengths & weaknesses  
of Air Sec System

Strengths  
System

no sig event (domestic) for 8-10 yrs  
appeared things were working OK  
profiling was in place to counter explosives  
emphasis on capacity & congestion  
Flynn - great deal of confidence

Weaknesses

Ability to detect their screening points  
may never get to 100%  
Sharing of intel info - now more apparent

There was a daily <sup>intel</sup> brief - Shuley Miller  
looked at it - Flynn had open door  
Always felt comfortable he was getting  
what was available  
He didn't need on daily basis

- ACI produced
- Shuley read
- Cued M.B.
- He cued J.G.

Spring/Summer 2001

\* Doesn't recall anything that made  
him feel threat level was higher  
certainly not domestically  
Sharing was a problem, (post facto)

He wasn't aware of hijacker prior activity

His awareness - highest threat was explosives

5.12. Great Concern <sup>FIA</sup> ~~to~~ Lm to FBI was doing a lot of things, ~~a~~ a blindness

Ans. knew we had Lm, no knowledge of concerns, never came to his attention  
FIA not intel gatherer  $\rightarrow$  depends on others  
over years FIA made efforts to get w/ CIA

8.3. Concern domestic v. foreign?

Volume of data was international  
couldn't tell you what capability FBI had

How?

men 98 FIA assessment - probably looked at it after

Feb 99 - not aware - aware they did those kind of analyses

2000 Prospects - don't recall

Comfortable that if there was any action to be taken, it would have been taken - advisories, SOAs, phone call

8.5 Pat McDonnell assessed beginning in 2000

Prepared for industry

Slide 24

Ans: lots of comments covering all bases, at Intel does



Doesn't recall the document

J.R. aware of UBL & AQ prior?

Honest answer, no.

Wasn't on his radar screen

Remembers the new rule making

Threat was a "domestic bomber"

Ans: low probability, high impact

## CARS I

Remembers implementation

His view - maybe fewer people screened,  
but that was the intent

focused to checked baggage only, to explosives

Profile also geared to bombers

His recollection - if not profile bugs had to  
be cleared via detection

a reflection of fact people were thinking  
explosives was the threat

His attitude - screening is a constant effort to  
keep force alert & focused

- it is tough

- always a Q of balance

- system built around schedules

Since from '72 it would never be perfect

~~Q~~ A.J. Where were we 2000/2001?

Data on detection rates - slightly improving

rates not acceptable to any of us

emphasis on better equip - better training

Flynn 'pulled back' [?] no way to  
quantifiably test screeners - waiting  
for TIPS - to certify

Decision on resources in security - made  
by Irish

- until shop sig improve in 90's after

- PA103 - threat & vul assessments

comes together at Irish level

Fines for carriers How did that work

Ans. ~~Compliance~~ Compliance & Enforcement issue

emphasis on penalties up & down

AD an inspector he followed the case

Doesn't have concerns about way cases were settled  
in the end

Doesn't recall discussion about revocation  
of carrier certification

### Common Strategy

Improved several times over the years

not designed to combat what happened on 9/11

- ensure FAA, FBI Carrier were jointly on board

- was aware of updating & no role in Movies effort

~~to raise awareness~~

FAM program died over the years - FAA

had higher priorities

8-10 years not a single domestic hijacking

Cockpit doors

Doesn't know if there were real silver balls

Issues about how to reinforce & potential  
safety concerns - stunningly complex  
And cert folks did good job of figuring out (post)  
had to do that  
Prior - no safety person would have made the  
trade off

Security did come later to the FAA with the  
wave of hijackings in the '70s  
72-75 down hijacks to Cuba  
FAA should be lead agency for hijackings <sup>market</sup>  
- on a/c in distress  
safety - security meshed  
- well understood, worked very well, back then  
Even on safety side - FAA doesn't build  
train etc - it is regulatory  
No fundamental diff in way sec & saf  
programs were merged or manifested  
to industry  
As general rule industry paid more attention to  
safety  
Cockpit keys  
No one really thought it was a significant risk  
He was aware of it - one key fits all

## 9/11 Narrative

- At work in a meeting in Air Traffic Shuley Skandly in Jersey - we need to go to Ops Center a plane has hit the WTC
- First thing he saw was the hole in the building
- talking to folks in ops, Moore really knows what happened - consensus general av. no thought that anyone deliberately flew into bldg
- After few minutes learned about concerns AT had w/ AA11
- in between ops center & his office calling over to Dept to get plane, she was a way, may have tried to couple folks
- talking to John F. Bahrthy when he saw second plane hit WTC on TV
- trying to figure out who/what plane was/were
- Went back to ops center - somewhat chaotic - Belger was running the show
- ZAW, ZNY started to make ground stop decisions - wouldn't second guess any of that
- Glad they didn't follow some of rules that were in place - did have authority to make ground stops Glad someone called NORTH

- Some supervisors called NORAD directly - good thinking
- Even before Flaherty - ops center was in process of setting up the normal security net
- ~~- Tactical Net~~
- Primary Net - principal players  
                     FAA                      Principal facilities  
                     DOT  
                     open net to talk strategically
- Tactical Net  
                     Lower level  
                     doesn't know if FAA only
- Prime  
                     NMCC should have been on first he's heard they were met
- after United hit Trade was on phone w/ J.F.
- Focus on the regions & what needed to be done
- Around 0920 talking about a Natl ground stop - Heindon making some decision
- Trys to figure out what a/c had hit etc
- Administrator probably in contact w/
- Dave Conrads had service on Check List et al

0920 - 0945 lot of confusing reports

that were coming on

e.g. report of crash on Ind/My

border - spec AA 77

AT had lost contact

- both he & Administrator talking

to Am An & United

~~Paul Chen~~

~~Bob Baker~~

Don Bundy - gone →

~~Bob Baker~~

~~Don~~

Don't remember

J.R. Discussion on notifying contacts to increase security

NO

talking about shut down

Didn't talk on either net?

Hammery - Senior ~~Sec~~ guy on  
or Longtime Primary Net

They would have coordinated  
net response

Didn't know NMCC wasn't on

distinct impression they <sup>and</sup> were on net  
at some point

mentioned net repo at ATASCC

Not aware about NORAD in area until  
after Pentagon crash

Higdon Carol - Senior Security - Lee Longmire

after fact based NORAD notified directly

Regard covered should have been done  
but he didn't hear about it or  
participate

AA77 - UA 93 period

not sure how he heard about it  
few minutes later he & Jane  
on phone w Sec

Few minutes later Sec said  
everything done 0940-0945  
issued 0946. Attention turned  
to monitoring until 1215 all  
comm a/c down

Total of UA 93 crash shortly after event!

~~Didn't go~~

Didn't know re AA77

into it - absolutely not -  
mail company just - UA &  
AA didn't want since what  
a/c but it or WTC

Bob Baker American

+ someone in VA ops

Pete McDonald

Andy Stuckert

a/c carriers were looking for  
information

Frustrating trial

Could not get confirm that it was  
AA into  $\diamond$

### Weapons & Tactics

- was told boxcutters & they stormed airports
- primary source needs - from cell calls
- Doesn't recall specifics

[shawn exec sum]

Doesn't remember seeing it

Didn't read anything for several days

No knowledge of "guns" until couple days  
later - from American

### Boxcutters

"All over the news". Doesn't remember  
if someone told him "what everyone  
was talking about"

Never wrote a statement

~~Grand Stop~~

No statement - exec. may not have  
gone thru screening

Lot of spec early on that weapons were  
planted later in the day

Wasn't based on info but on wishful  
thinking

Never any evidence that they were planted  
or an inside job

### Grand Stop

no SOP, then turned attention to airlines  
as to where their % were



- ✓ Radar
- 1) Crews
- 2) Butch
- 3) other
- off 93

He was doing that & working on radar decisions  
 Any discussion of other possible plots  
 not part of any discussions or aware  
 later about such

His focus was on getting planes down  
 wasn't concerned about pilot or controller panic

Hubs of activity

4 in HQ

Admin 10th Floor

Ops Centre 10th Floor

ACI  
 10th Floor

ATCSCC

ATC - 10th Floor

Sec - 3d Floor

Areas - West

East

& - Mid West

off 93 - pretty comfortable

Revel

Dave Combes

OAC

Bill Roscoe or Jeff G

ATC

He would have no

Adm

Lee Longmire

Working Room

Charles

ACI

## Battle Fighters

217 NY TRAGON

200

210

200

NEADS

119th & 102d FWO + Andrews

## Battle Management

NEADS BC / CONR

AME / ASIA

ATCSCC

NMCC

113th FWO / SS

## Campaign Management

NOBDD

JCS

FAA / DOT

PEOC

#### Belger Notes, Relevant Points

- There was daily intel brief—Shirley Miller looked at it—Flynn had open door. Always felt comfortable he was getting what was available. Didn't read on a daily basis—ACUI produced, Shirley read and cued him and he cued Garvey
- Spring-Summer 2001—Doesn't recall anything that made him feel threat level was higher, certainly not domestically. He learned post facto that intel sharing was a problem. Wasn't aware of hijacker activity prior to 9/11. Highest threat was explosives.
- Aware of UBL and AQ prior to 9/11, honest answer, No, weren't on his radar screen. Threat of a "domestic Bojinka" was low probability, high impact.
- Day of 9/11
  - At work in meeting in AT, Shirley standing in doorway saying we need to go to Ops Center a plane has hit WTC
  - First thing he saw was hole in [north tower]
  - Talked to folks in Pos, no one really knew what happened—consensus was general aviation, no thought that anyone deliberately flew into building
  - After few minutes learned about concern AT had with AA11
  - Went back/forth between Ops Center and his office, calling over to DoT to get Jane, she was away, may have talked to couple of other folks
  - Talking to John Flaherty when he saw second plane hit WTC on TV
  - Trying to figure out who/what planes was/were
  - Went back to Ops center—somewhat chaotic—He, Belger, was running the show
  - ZBW, ZNY started to make ground stop decisions—wouldn't second guess any of that
  - Glad they didn't follow some of rules that were in place—did have authority to issue ground stop—glad someone called NORAD
  - Some supervisors called NORAD directly, good thinking
  - Even before talked to Flaherty, Ops center was in process of setting up the normal security net
  - Primary Net. Principal players, FAA, DoT, principal facilities, open net to talk strategically. NMCC should have been on. First he has heard they were not
  - Tactical Net. Lower level, doesn't know if FAA only
  - After United hit WTC was on phone with Flaherty, focus on the regions and what needed to be done

- Around 0920 talking about a National ground stop—Herndon making same decision
- Trying to figure out which a/c hit which tower
- Dave Canoles best source on check list, et al
- 0920-0945 Lots of confusing reports that were coming in, e. g. report of crash on Indy/Ky border, speculation AA77. AT had lost contact
- Both he and Administrator talked to AA and UAL—Russ Chu or Bob Baker at AA, doesn't remember at UAL. Jane talked to Don Cardy at AA.
- Didn't talk on either net. Believes Hemmery or Longmire was senior guy on primary net. They would have coordinated military response. Didn't know NMCC wasn't on.
- Distinct impression military was on net at some point. Mentioned military reps at ATCSCC
- Hijack coordinator was senior security official—Lee Longmire. Only after the fact did he learn that NORAD was contacted directly
- Hijack coordination should have been done, but he didn't hear about it or participate
- AA77-UA93. Not sure how he heard about Pentagon. Few minutes later he and Jane were on phone with Secretary. Few minutes later Sec said bring everything down—0940-0945, issued 0946. Attention turned to monitoring until 1215 and all comm. a/c were down
- Told of UA93 crash shortly after event. Didn't recall when he knew AA77 was Pentagon plane, that was most confusing part. AA and UA weren't sure which a/c hit Pentagon or WTC. Reference to Bob Baker at American and someone in UA Ops, Pete McDonald or Andy Studdart
- a/c carriers were looking for information.
- Frustrated that he could not get confirmation that it was AA plane into Pentagon
- Hubs or activity
  - Admin 10<sup>th</sup> floor
  - Ops Center 10<sup>th</sup> floor, also ACI
  - ATC 10<sup>th</sup> floor
  - Security 3d floor
- Key people
  - Ops, Canoles
  - ATC, Peacock or Griffith
  - Working Room, Longmire

o ACI, Manno

Monte Belger | 4/19/04

Got info from ICS & discussions w/ Security people  
No focused briefing that summer  
or formal briefing on the threat

Circular re hijack threat → see Team 7  
- dktro was up to ACS

6 Aug PDB  
5 Jul Clarke initiative  
rep would have been Canavan  
or Flynn

His reaction on 9/11 "genuinely surprised"  
fundamental threat awareness  
tradition by and for ransom

No ~~has~~ remembrance of Lufthansa  
Spring 1993

He referred up back to the ICS  
for threat info - game, set, match

Why Division re FAA, mil & FBI  
Back to '80s

magnette of tires shot out  
Hijacked a/c is in distress & a  
safety issue

∴ FAA Admin in charge while  
in flight

When a hijack  
DoD in net  
DoD could be requested

Reery ~ 1996 - this in reference  
to line & black chart

~~ACCO 1~~

ACO 1 Lee Longmire

Day of 9/11

at work 7am  
general status work

Morning meeting

Jeff G. got a page

M.S. to mens room

Shirley M got him on way back

& they went to ACC, <sup>on way</sup> watched  
TV and got status report

re transponder

me first learned of hijack as a possibility  
2d but

~~Think~~ Thinka Lee Longmire broke in  
maybe 2 minutes - learned on 2nd hit WTC  
Back to office to talk maybe  
to AT. AT has a desk in  
ACC

Sec office was calling  
was on phone w/ John Flaherty when  
2d one hit - John said a 2d  
one hit

Administrator was in Sec office for a  
meeting

Discussion was on size of % that  
hit

Nothing in that 2-3 minutes  
flew up to give situational awareness  
over/above an % struck WTC

After 2<sup>nd</sup> hit - may have gone back  
to ACC & that may be when he  
got additional information

- potential for hijacking
- problems w/ other aircraft
- strange reports coming in
- sorting out fast & faster

Lee is running the place - he  
had a net up (assumption)

Doesn't recall going to research  
spaces in the morning - maybe  
in the afternoon

Back to 702

Toe Net Internal to FAA

Primary Net bring in other Fed Agencies

SS

FBI

Dod(NMCC)

Company

Airport

Prime AT facilities

Assumes they had right people  
on the net



From Logo

Tac Net 0850

Prim Net 0920

ROC would set up own net  
either both/and tactical & security

Knew AT was doing their own  
Communications

Talking to  
Herndon  
+ Field Facilities

WOC had TSD screen

Assumes Doug & Jeff were down  
at Peacock office

Dana SVTS MB, JG, LO, JG one of the 4

↳ Generally called by White House

Pete Varga

DoD

State

FBI

SS

FAA/DOT

Dick Clarke <sup>or Lisa</sup> WH [SR?]

CIA

may be not  
all at once

Can't distinguish AM from PM

prob not before Pent hit

Asked for general status + lots in distress  
+ any threats

Dana's polling questions

Doesn't recall real time  
discussions in SVTS  
- re scrambling aircraft

Contact w Sec DOT

Sec was talking to him in his  
office - Sec made the first call  
maybe in WOC

no one other than JG or MB talked  
to Sec DOT - not sure where he was

# of reports of a/c in distress - most  
false Sec DOT was asking about  
these & other threat (bomb) reports  
- recalled the KAL report

Q re AA77

a/c bearing down on DC

we thought AA77 had crashed

at one pt 5 a/c dealing w

- [11]

- [15]

- 77 thought crashed

- 93

- + w/i flying back in eastern  
direction

doesn't remember talking to Sec  
about that

remembers a v/i primary radar  
track id'd by folks w/

of Dulles - speculation was VFR

Q re 93

little before 0930 aware  
of prob w/ 93

"dozens of situations" we thought  
were hijack

He was getting reports about 93 - knew  
it by call sign - another w/c in  
distress

→ Break →

Q re 93

→ everyone was following that in  
real time including military  
primary net was set up at  
0924, according to leg

military

Langley  
-- F16s scrambled in response to 77

-- Over DC area

-- on the net (primary) Athens in  
didn't know that they Room  
were

NMCC

UA93 subsequently  
mil interviews → Langley positioned  
by line of 93 open line of comms  
connection w mil

- He was told that NMCC was on primary  
net [log shows 0920]  
WCC should have time people into  
the net

- UA93 he recalled 0925

- DOT guidance → be sensitive as to  
what putting out re timelines →  
Didn't recall Joff G → Gen Arnold  
Gave chronologies to DOT

Fighters launched in response to u/i a/c  
later determined to be AA77

? got notification about AA77 hijack

Remembers vividly  
AA77 — crashed  
u/i headed east

Made assumption ml had UA93 real time

UA93 recalled it was one on which we were  
getting updates

Assumed ACC people had UA93 & assumed  
they were talking to Conales land

re AAT-20 chrono re AA77

How to tie it down factually

1. WOC log of when other agencies were bridged in
2. Whosever was running the primary net
3. Other agencies - were you on
4. Notifications to NORAD

F

Surprised by NORAD press release

No record that FAA asked military  
to do anything re UA93

re UA93

Never heard there was a  
notification issue re UA93

NTMO East Transcript


Recommendations

Make sure we [currently] prepared

TSA now in loop

→ has former FAA response  
re hijacking

and feeling about procedures comm



not exercised until  
clear out of mode  
will file clearly exercise

not a mistake to transfer authority

back to 93 & VP

its been said publicly

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**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

Event: Monte Belger, former Deputy Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration

Type of event: Interview

Date: April 20, 2004

Special Access Issues: None

Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown

Team Number: 8

Location: FAA Headquarters Building, Washington, DC

Participants - Non-Commission: Brook Avery, Office of the Chief Counsel, FAA

Participants - Commission: Team 8: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

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Note: Please refer to the recorded interview for further details.

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**Background:**

Monte Belger was with the FAA for thirty years, and began his career in 1972. He worked at various Regions, including the Great Lakes and Eastern Region. At Great Lakes, he became a Division Manager for Airport Safety. Shortly thereafter he became Deputy Director of Great Lakes, and in 1988 moved to the FAA Washington Headquarters. He had several associate administrator positions there, and served as Acting Deputy Administrator from 1997 to September of 2002. The Administrator during this time was Jane Garvey. Belger was Deputy Administrator under Transportation Secretary Slater and Transportation Secretary Mineta.

The Deputy Administrator is responsible for support and advice to the Administrator. "Virtually everything" Garvey was involved in Belger was.

On September 11, 2001 (9/11) the ATS-1, the highest Air Traffic Administrator, was Steve Brown. Bill Peacock worked under Brown. General Mike Canavan was the highest ranking Civil Aviation Administrator. Lynn Osmus was the Deputy Civil Aviation Administrator.

**Summer prior of 2001:**

Belger was aware of the security information circulars distributed by the FAA, as well as concern from Admiral Flynn, the former Civil Aviation Administrator, regarding security threats. al Qaeda was mentioned in a number of the information circulars.

Belger characterized the general theme of threats as focused on overseas U.S. interests; hijacks were considered, but overseas and traditional in nature. He received this

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information from the circulars, and from discussions regarding the circulars with members of the FAA's Civil Aviation Security office. He received no specific briefing because of a "heightened" threat level, and noted to Commission staff that he does not view the threats assessments received by the FAA in the summer of 2001 as reflective of an unusual or in-ordinate anxiety level for towards threats. He chose not to comment on what General Canavan and those members of FAA Civil Aviation Security he spoke with knew regarding a heightened threat.

It was not one of Belger's responsibilities to "sign off" on the security circulars that were distributed. The security office met with him twice a week in staff meetings, and he made himself available to them.

When the circulars did reference hijacking it was a traditional model, and he did not receive a sense that the FAA should have required the airlines to take different steps in their security measures.

He never received information that reflected the Commission staff's characterization of the August 6<sup>th</sup> Presidential Briefing. He was not willing to postulate on what might have been done if he received information reflective of that document. Belger does not know if that information was ever received by Jane Garvey, but she never brought such information to him.

Belger commented that information of an impending attack, coming from a higher level of government (i.e. White House), would have prompted the lead of a law enforcement/intelligence organization, and would not have prompted lone FAA initiative "in a vacuum."

Belger and Garvey were not on a distribution list for the Senior Executive Intelligence Brief (SEIB).

Belger had no relationship with the Dick Clarke, and was aware of him in name only. ACS-1 – General Canavan, and before him General Flynn – would have been the FAA representative to Clarke's task force. Belger does not recall any specific information on the meetings attending by General Canavan.

Belger commented that "I am honestly not sure if the threat level can be characterized by 'heightened'". Belger further commented that in the 1970s and early 1980s "there was a hijacking every weekend". He does not recall the threat levels indicated in the 1970s and early 1980s, and can "only say" that in 2001 the steps taken by the FAA were appropriate for what the information they received. Belger was curious to know what a comparison of circulars between 2001 and 2000 would display. [Belger commented that Team 8 should "look more carefully" at the specifics in the security circulars before asking for the details of documents already in its possession.]



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Belger reacted to the 9/11 attacks with "surprise that an event like that occurred – and could occur – in the United States...we thought the threat was fundamentally overseas, and we thought it would be a more traditional, two or three day hostage situation."

Belger did not recall having involvement in the 1993 Lufthansa hijacking.

To Belger's knowledge, the FAA did not have any additional intelligence threat information despite that demonstrated in the intelligence circulars.

**Pre-9/11: Hijack experience**

Belger noted that the "first" hijacking that involved a U.S. military response was in 1976.

Periodically multi-agency exercises addressed hijacks. Belger also believed the FAA Aviation Security offices may have exercised hijacks. He does not recall the specific time periods in which these exercises took place.

Belger does not remember a specific testing within the FAA in the months preceding 9/11 that exercised Headquarters and upper FAA response to hijacks. If one had taken place he believes it would have been brought to his attention.

Belger commented that prior to 9/11 inter-agency response protocols were well established. He believed it was clear during a hijack when the FAA would seek the assistance of other agencies. He is unsure if this clarity exists today since the roles of the agencies have shifted. He would like to see a Commission recommendation towards inter-agency exercise and training.

In the 1980s there were "a couple" of hijack situations in Florida in which law enforcement took action that endangered the aircraft without furthering a resolution to the situation. Congress came to the conclusion that "a hijack aircraft is an aircraft in distress...and that it is a safety issue while the aircraft is in flight" – this led to an agreement that the FAA would be the lead response point while the aircraft was airborne, and the FBI would take the lead once it was on the ground. Belger believes this system worked well in the early 1980s. Memorandums of Understanding (MoU) were drafted between the FAA and the FBI, and DoD would be involved at the request of either party – the FAA might request a fighter escort, whereas the FBI might request DoD assistance in their response operations.

Belger believes that there has been a hijack coordinator "since 1970"; but it was not an executive manager. He believes the hijack coordinator was always under Aviation Security. Lee Longmire was the hijack coordinator on 9/11:

**9/11:**

Belger arrived at FAA Headquarters at 0700. He had a general meeting with the Air Traffic personnel and at roughly 0855 walked into the Washington Operations Center

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(WOC) – at this point Belger was not informed of a hijacking. He believed it the impact he at the World Trade Center was caused by an incapacitated pilot. He immediately went to the WOC Aviation Crisis Center (ACC). He then went back to his office and called Air Traffic to see what they advised be done. He believes he may have called Jeff Griffith at Air Traffic. The Secretary's office called for information, which he passed. Belger was on the phone with John Flaherty when UAL 175 struck the WTC, at which point he spoke with the Administrator.

Belger first heard that the aircraft had been hijacked after UAL 175's impact. He returned to the Operation Center, and began to receive more information through Aviation Security. Belger recalls he was on the phone "constantly". He learned of the potential for multiple hijacked and/or distressed aircraft during these conversations.

**Teleconference Nets:**

Belger is familiar with the FAA Tactical Net – which is internal to the FAA – and the FAA Primary Net – which is inter-agency. The type of net established depends on the type of response desired.

Belger believes the Aviation Security head, Lee Longmeir, was controlling a teleconference net; but he did not ask specifically if the net was continuous, or which agencies were present.

Belger was aware that there was a conference call originating from the room Cannoles was working in, but he does not believe he participated. He believes the Tactical Net began at roughly 0820, and has no knowledge of what type of net was initiated at the Regional level.

Belger's understanding of the Cannoles Telecom was that it consisted of information from Air Traffic. Air Traffic is responsible, on 9/11, for those in their own chain of command.

Belger commented that he believes the only Traffic Situational Display (TSD) at FAA Headquarters was in the WOC. He does not know of any other TSD locations. [Note: Commission staff has learned that there are numerous TSD displays at FAA Headquarters, including the one referred to by Belger.] According to Belger, someone with air traffic experience would never use a TSD for precise data. When the airspace was cleared, the WOC used the TSD to monitor the number of aircraft still airborne.

Belger was receiving "almost constant communication" with the Air Traffic group through Jeff Griffith. Belger was looking for real time information from the facilities to flow into the Air Traffic group on the tenth floor, and then to him in the WOC. Belger expected the Command Center to have two lines of communications to FAA Headquarters. He expected, from an air traffic management standpoint, that Herndon spoke with both the Air Crisis Center and with the conference room in which David Cannoles conducted a telecom. [Note: Cannoles, as head of Air Traffic Investigations,

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began a teleconference after the first impact per standard procedures in the case of a large scale air incident. This conference continued through the events of 9/11 and acted as an improvised conduit of information to various FAA facilities and other agencies.] Belger recalls that there were "uniforms" (military personnel) in the WOC during the course of the morning.

**Secure Video Teleconference (SVT):**

Belger does not recall when the SVT calls began – "they started and then they were continuous". Griffith, the administrator, and Osmus were the primary participants. These calls were multi-agency, and served the purpose of passing information on an ongoing basis. He recalls there being participants from the Department of Defense (DoD) (not Rumsfeld or Myers, but Pete Virga consistently, and other uniform representatives), the State Department, Federal Bureau of Investigations, Secret Service, FAA, Department of Transportation, White House (Dick Clarke), and Central Intelligence Agency – but representatives from every one of these agencies were not participants on every call. Belger described the SVT as a series of meetings throughout the day. He does not remember who asked him to appear on the SVT, but does not believe it happened before the Pentagon was struck by AAL 77. The FAA was asked to provide general status information, or information on other real time airborne threats. He received the information he passed on the SVT from the sources feeding into the ACC.

Belger does not remember a real-time (while the aircraft were still airborne) discussion about any of the specific flights (AAL 11, UAL 175, AAL 77, UAL 93) on the SVT. He does not recall learning any information on distressed aircraft from the SVT, nor about fighter aircraft scrambles. In his recollection, most of the SVT discussions were after-the-fact (that afternoon or in the following days). The meetings Belger participated in "were not incident management discussions". Belger believes that AAL 11 was identified "shortly" after its impact – but he does not recall specifics. "There were a thousand discussions that day – whatever we knew at the time the questions were asked was provided".

Belger does not remember a "shoot down order" passed over the SVT.

**Conversations with the Secretary of Transportation:**

Belger believes the "first call" he received was from Secretary Mineta, and that this occurred shortly after the impacts of AAL 11 and UAL 175. The FAA executive staff at the WOC gave Menetta, John Flaherty, and Michael Jackson status reports – these were not on an open line, but were continuous "multi-minute" calls from, "generally" Belger's office, with "a couple of calls" fielded in the WOC. Belger is not aware of any one else who spoke with the Secretary that morning except for himself and Garvey. Belger does believe he knew that the Secretary was in the bunker of the White House, or that the Secretary was with Vice POTUS – "he might have told me this afterwards". Menetta asked many status questions, and asked for clarification on media reports. Belger

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specifically recalls concern over a Korean Airlines flight near Alaska that had to be clarified for the Secretary.

Belger does not believe he heard reports of an aircraft headed to Washington, DC. Further, he believes he was informed that AAL 77 [Pentagon, 0938] had crashed. At another point they believed there were five aircraft to be considered a serious threat.

Belger clearly recalled reports of a "high speed VFR" headed eastward, though Belger does not recall speaking with the Secretary about this. The aircraft was characterized as an unidentified primary radar track that air traffic had identified east of Dulles.

From Belger's perspective, he "obviously" knew there was a threat to DC when AAL 77 crashed into the Pentagon.

Belger believes the Langley fighters were launched in response to "the unidentified aircraft...we did not know it was AAL 77...one of the most frustrating things I experienced that day was being unable to identify which aircraft hit the Pentagon". The Langley fighters, according to Belger, were scrambled for "the unidentified aircraft that later turned out to be AAL 77", and that since the FAA thought it had crashed, "I don't know what the military was thinking".

**AAL 11 Airborne after 8:46AM:**

Belger commented that "I think I do remember something about that". Belger commented that the level of detail that was described to him by Commission staff regarding the reports of AAL 11 headed south to Washington, DC would not have reached his attention.

Though he remembers vividly discussing AAL 77 as crashed, and discussions about a VFR aircraft headed eastward, he does not vividly recall reports of AAL 11 headed south to DC. Belger does not recall Doug Davis discussing this with him.

**UAL 93:**

Belger believes that "a little before 9:30AM" they might have known about Flight 93, though at the time they did not know that it had turned and was headed back to Washington, DC. Belger "knew there was a problem with United 93 around 9:30AM" – UAL 93 "was one of dozens that initially came into us just as seriously as UAL 93...the first time I probably learned about UAL 93 was in the context of all those other ones." Belger remembers receiving reports on an aircraft by the call sign UAL 93 – but does not remember specifically what he was told other than "it was another aircraft under distress."

Belger then told Commission staff that he recollects that at the time UAL 93 was in distress "everybody including the military was following it real time...the primary net had been set up...the Langley fighters had been scrambled and were being held over the

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Washington area...I remember news reports in the weeks after that said the military was holding its fighters over the Washington, DC area...by the time of UAL 93 the military – the people – were hearing things real time.” Belger’s basis for this assumption was that 1) they knew the F-16s had been scrambled; 2) they knew the F-16s were over the DC area; and 3) they knew the “military folks” were on the primary net. Belger believes the Langley fighters were scrambled after AAL 77. Belger based his opinion that the military was involved on the fact that the “primary net was up”; but he cannot recall directly hearing a military presence. He does not recall UAL 93 being followed on the SVT.

**UAL 93, post-9/11 reconstruction of facts, and military notification:**

Subsequently, Belger has learned through interviews with “several DoD folks” that the Langley fighters were in position over DC to cover if UAL 93 had reached Washington, DC. All the information that Belger received was that by the time of UAL 93 there was an “open line of continuous communication with the military.” To Belger, this was the “primary net”. He believes this was confirmed by a NORAD press release [NORAD released a timeline on 9/19/01]. Belger recalled no communication between the FAA and the military about problems on the notification on UAL 93.

Belger was told by his staff that the National Military Command Center (NMCC) was on the primary net. He thinks when the WOC calls other agencies to bring them into the net the time of the call is recorded and logged. Belger commented that the Duty Officer should have kept a hand written log of who was called and when they were placed into the primary net. Belger believes he received prepared chronologies regarding the primary net.

Belger commented that there was guidance from the Justice Department not to publicly release any time-specific document post-9/11. This was “general knowledge.” The FAA did give chronologies to the DoT, and “obviously if the White House or DoJ asked for it, they would have received it”. Belger recalls seeing a document in which NORAD cited a notification time for UAL 93 that was before the FAA even knew there was a problem with the aircraft. Even though Belger referred to the information he believes he received from NORAD as being recorded in the NORAD “logs” when shown the NEADS MCC Tech Log from 9/11, he had not seen it before.

Belger believes UAL 93 was monitored by all agencies because it was “one of the four” that he received updates on. Belger himself did not check with the military as to whether or not they had information on UAL 93. He assumed through discussions he had with “the air traffic folks” that they were communicating with the military. Belger believes the military was on the primary net and discussing events with the Air Traffic conference call. The chronologies “given to me indicated that the NMCC was on the primary net”.

That there is no notification time to the military for UAL 93 in *Summary of Air Hijacking Events* can be explained, in Belger’s opinion, by the assumption that the NMCC was on the primary net.

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There was no discussion in his recollection of a lack of notification times on UAL 93 between the military and the FAA, which has been described to Commission staff in other HQ interviews. Belger commented that this information did not reach him officially, unofficially, in hearings, or in "dozens of interviews" with the media.

Belger noted that Falcone "should have been taking the information from the tactical net, and passing it to the folks on the primary net. That's his job as coordinator."

Belger said "I'm assuming it from thirty years of history" – that the NMCC was on the primary net. Belger commented that he would look for the primary net by asking 1) from the WOC if they have a log for when "other agencies were bridged into the primary net"; 2) "whoever was running the primary net from the security organization, ask them who was on the primary net"; 3) "ask the other agencies from 9:20AM on"; 3) "in terms of notifications to NORAD, rather than rely on FAA reports that say 'NEADS logs show', go back to the FAA and speak to those people who made those calls to NEADS within the FAA.

Belger was "surprised that they put out a press release" (NORAD, 9/18/01) considering the guidance they received from DoJ. Belger commented that he believes DoJ asked them not to put out releases because of the potential for a criminal investigation. Belger does not believe when they reviewed the release that they noticed inconsistencies in the timeline. Belger does not know why Darlene Freeman left out the information on UAL 93 from her FAA document.

Belger stated that he did not receive direct confirmation that the NMCC was on a FAA Primary Net when information was communicated on UAL 93. Further, he does not believe there is any information that the FAA asked the military to "do anything" regarding UAL 93, and commented that there is no record "to point to that UAL 93 was discussed with the military". He holds the position that the NMCC was on the primary net, and thus "notified" of UAL 93. Belger clarified that he did not imply that he believes NORAD was on the primary net, he believes the NMCC was. [Note: Commission staff suspects what Belger believes was a primary net was the tactical net, and did not include the NMCC.]

Belger insisted that he never heard of a disagreement with NORAD over notification times. Belger is not aware of any direction from a higher authority that any dispute between the military and the FAA should be arbitrated and resolved in a certain manner.

Belger commented that he possessed a matrix of times to track the four flights. It was a one page documents; had four or five entries vertically, and it was marked "not applicable" for the time entry on military notification of UAL 93.

Belger believes that in either a Congressional testimony, at the May 2003 hearing, or in another forum, a NORAD representative stated publicly that they could not shoot down UAL 93.

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**Recommendations:**

Belger commented that with a "brand new organization", the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) "in the loop" there needs to be clarification of the procedures between NORAD, FBI, TSA and FAA, and these procedures need a clearer set of MoU and periodic, well thought-out exercises.