## 5/7/04 Interview with Mike Weikert

- L. Sullivan
- M. Kara
- C. Beyer, TSA Counsel

- Airport Cop at Dulles before 1986
- 1986 — Started w/ FAA ACS
- 1987-88 — Federal Air marshall Program
- 1995 — ACS — Operations under ACO
- 1995-96 — Staff member Crisis mgmt Standards and Evaluation Division
- 9/11/01 — he was Staff member in ACO
  ↓
  reported To Carolyn Riley
  ↓
  she reported To Willie Gripper and Lee Longmire.

- Lee Longmire — Senior ACO guy
- Willie Gripper — Longmire's deputy

— He never worked a real hijack.

— <u>AVIATION COMMAND CENTER — ACC</u>

ACC room — SciF area off TO right of ACC
↳ <u>mini Watch</u> — manned by Intel Watch people from ACI

— The 2 people in charge of room sit on devs in front of room.

— FAA Tactical net ⇒ Internal use for FAA entities (mainly FAA security entities).

— Primary net ⇒ meant To Engage outside agencies like CIA, FBI, etc.

ACC

② Deputy ACO   ① — ACO-1

Primary NET ⊗

airline (PSI) liason ⊗   Tactical net ⊗

Primary net Event recorder ⊗   ⊗   Tac net Event recorder ⊗

⊗   ⊗ public affairs?   ⊗ — air Traffic?

Intelligence Expert?   — aviation explosives Expert? or Hazmat Expert

[ACC]

② [X]   ⟨On Day of 9-11⟩   ① [X] Steve Brown

5. (X)   ④ (⊗)   3 (X)
mike Weikert   Janet Rife   Pete Falcone
Primary net

8 — (X)   ⑦ (X)   6 (X) The net event recorder
Tom Tapple   Chuck Duffey
Primary net
Event Recorder

— He says it seemed like Air Traffic took over the dais (front of room).

— Weikert says he passed information back and forth to folks on dais from Air Traffic.

Day of 9-11

— in Cafeteria — 2ND FL having coffee - 8:45

— rec'd page from ACI - Watch, 3RD FL

— He reported to ACI Watch on 3RD FL.

— Page told him to call ACI-Watch

— He went to ACI — Bob McLaughlin. Claudio Manno and others had information that flt. attendant was stabbed and hijackers may be in control of cockpit

— Weehert and Bob Clarke went to 10th FL. to activate ACC.

— Bob McLaughlin went to alert Lee Longmire and other ACS security experts.

— He told Sharon Battle to stand up the ACC.

— He thinks Matt Hahn opened the mini-SCIF on the 10th FL.

— they had just set up a computer system to track multiple events on a computer "log" format.

✳ — These logs were kept on 9-11 day Primary net and Tactical net event recorders.

— Weikert says he told WOC— (Sharon Battle) to activate the entire ACC room and not just the tactical NET.

— Pete Falcone took over the Tactical net position.

— He sits in the primary net position.

— When he arrived at the ACC, he saw aftermath of WTC-1 crash.

— First thought — WTC-1 crash not related to hijacked plane.

— He then saw WTC-2 Crash on T.V. (either live or replay)

— Had not heard about 2nd hijacked plane when he saw WTC-2 crash.

— He heard about second hijacked plane after WTC-2 Crash.

— It took some time to sort out which A/C hit which bldg.

— no discussion - he recalls about getting military help when he arrived At ACC.

— Somewhere ~~before~~ 9:20 A.M. - Werket got on the Primary Net.

6

— It took some time for other parties to get on the line.

— 9:20 A.M. → approx time Primary Net was activated and outside parties got on it.

— Protocol was for WOC officers to notify ACC what parties entered Primary Net.

— He relies on WOC folks to add appropriate parties to the Primary Net. WOC has a Checklist for this.

— He recalls FBI, DoS, WH Situation Room, DoD (for a brief period of time).

— ACO sent someone TO FBI SIOC.

— That person took over the role of net monitor on Primary net for FBI.

— He thinks USSS was on the Primary net for a little while.

— ~~He~~ He recalls DOS, FBI WH Sit Room (?), USSS (?).

— He thinks NMCC is brought into Primary net just TO monitor the net.

— He does not specifically recall NMCC joining the ~~FBI~~ Primary net.

— He does recall DOD briefly being on the Primary net.

— He recalls specifically trying to raise DoD on the Primary net to give them UAL 93 information.

— He recalls M. Belger in ACC
monitoring Primary net and
Tactical net re: UAL 93.

— He did not get specific
information on UAL 93 on
the Primary net. → He
did not have AT people on
his net.

— There was not much traffic
on his Primary net on
9/11. → He was giving
information on the P. net
and not receiving
much information.

— He knew there was a 4th A/C
that AT people in front of
ACC were concerned about.

— DA Belger and A.T. folks
monitored UAL 93 until it
crashed in PA.

— No UAL 93 update is coming
over the Primary net to Weikert.

— He overhears reports in room regarding UAL 93.

— He overheard some conversations about location of UAL 93 before it went down.

— There was a discussion in the room about whether DoD was on the line with anyone.

— Open question in the room about whether DoD was on the line. → He believes Mr. Belger tried to address this question.

— Mike Weikert calls out for DoD (military on his primary net and gets no response.

— He expected DoD to be on line but thought the Pentagon crash may have caused them to drop off the line.

— He vaguely recalls DoD being

on the Primary net briefly before the Pentagon was hit.

— At 10:15 am — Pete Falcone asks for military help on Tac net.

↳ This is probably re: Belgis's request for DoD help on UAL 93

— He got the impression that the military had already scrambled planes to D.C. area.

Mike Weikert | 5/7/04   FAA

Immigration & Customs Enforcement

FAA
↓ TSA
↓ ICE

FAA ACS 1986

Sr Intel Analyst

FAM Nov 87

WOC Not recorded

↘ 1995 ACS

↘ Staff Office
95 – 01

◄ Reports to

Person who was not there

Steve Brown

DAIS

Weikert   Riffe   Falcone
(Priv Nat)   (au carrier)   (Toe Nat)

Tom Taffe
(Dec)

Security
(Dec)   Chuck Guffy

9 positions

[Intel]   )AT([PA]   )S(

AVN OPS Mgrs in field

SCIF

Day of
  in cafeteria 0845
    paged by ACO Watch (Intel)
    went to SCIF
  Claudeo there
      some info already obtained
        maybe someone of flight deck
  Mc Laughlin sent to get Lee L. upstairs

AT 10th Floor
asked Sharon Battle to stand up the ACC
    open up the nets

    Mini SCIF
      Matt Hahn
  maybe Bart Merkling   NOIWON
                  downstairs

He said
He would quibble w/ 0850 entry
    He said get system fired up
    & then sat down at primary
    net position

    CNN on - saw first building in flames
  didn't know there was a 2d hijack
    when 2d tower was struck

Initial thought, not connected
[1st & 2d]
had no credible hijack info,
other than Stewardess & Cockpit

Heard about 2d hijack after 2d crash

no real discussion when he first
got up to 10th floor

○ prime net after 2d strike
-- he referred to log time of 0920
it took a while for the net to
active
- 0920 = time bridge was
activated — normally they
would announce that someone
was added
- relies on WOC to do the check list
& to add people to the net
- recalls FBI, State, WHSR for a while
NMCC on very briefly, CIA
sent a security person to FBI
SIOC, Karen Geise

He thought the back to from
bottom to top
logs we had were WOC logs

log   ACC activated 0858

- doesn't recall hearing that AA 11 was still airborne

- does think SS was on for a little while

- NMCC brought in on in listening mode re Spec Ops
  on briefly
  trying to raise them for
  Pentos crash, they weren't on anyones net
  Monte was in recon at the time

- neither net on speaker phone

- very little traffic on his net, meant people dropped off support team
  doesn't recall much traffic on that net that day

- Doesn't recall TSD being fed into TV — upper right corner CNN was on

- He overheard conversations at the dais around the time of 93
  - NMCC/DoD was not on his line
    spec Q "Does anybody have contact w/ DoD right now?"
    Perhaps Monte framing the Q.

C&C Problems
  - Pentagon strike too DoD off net
  - ~~Should have been~~ redundant comms
  - ~~T. Postoday~~ DEN is ~~established~~

  - 3d Floor would be where ATCC would have come in

  - It was pretty clear to him that AT was talking to CC, separate line

  - his critique — for ACC it was a collateral duty