Difference between revisions of "United Airlines Flight 175 Timeline"
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Latest revision as of 12:50, 13 September 2007
- (6:45 - 6:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Arriving at the airport
Page 1, Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
The call was placed from a pay phone in Terminal C (between the screening checkpoint and United 175’s boarding gate). We presume Shehhi made the call, but we cannot be sure. Logan International Airport site visit (Aug. 15, 2003); see also FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11).
Footnote 3 to Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
- (Shortly before 7 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Checking in
Page 2, Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
See UAL letter,“Flight 175—11Sep01 Passenger ACI Check-in History,” July 11, 2002. Customer service representative Gail Jawahir recalled that her encounter with the Ghamdis occurred at “shortly before 7 A.M.,” and when shown photos of the hijackers, she indicated that Mohand al Shehri resembled one of the two she checked in (suggesting they were Banihammad and Shehri). However, she also recalled that the men had the same last name and had assigned seats on row 9 (i.e., the Ghamdis), and that account has been adopted here. In either case, she almost certainly was dealing with one set of the Flight 175 hijackers. See FBI reports of investigation, interviews of Gail Jawahir, Sept. 21, 2001; Sept. 28, 2001. Even had the hijackers been unable to understand and answer the two standard security questions,the only consequence would have been the screening of their carry-on and checked bags for explosives. See FAA report,“Air Carrier Standard Security Program,” May 2001, p. 76.
Footnote 5 to Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
- (7:23 - 7:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boarding Flight 175
Page 2, Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
- (7:58 - 8:14 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 175 departs
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- (8:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001: First contact with Boston Center
- (8:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reaches cruising altitude
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- (8:37 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Asked to look for Flight 11
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- (8:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Spots Flight 11
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- (8:41 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Reports "suspicious transmission"
United's system operations control manager in Chicago reported that though he normally received relevant information about United flights from FAA air traffic control, on September 11, 2001, he did not recall receiving information about any air traffic control communications with or from Flight 175, including the 8:41 A.M. report. The other senior United Air Lines officials working in the operations center on 9/11 confirmed that they were never told of this communication, though they stated that air traffic controllers would "first and foremost" communicate directly with pilots. Furthermore, these officials reported that they never received any communication on the morning of September 11, 2001, from the FAA or the air traffic control system advising United to contact its aircraft about the hijackings.
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Dave Bottiglia: The first thing he said to me was, “We heard threatening transmissions being broadcast by the American.”
The pilots of the United flight have monitored a transmission from the hijacked plane, repeating to Bottiglia what they overhead in the American cockpit. Bottiglia: And his exact words were, “Everyone, stay in your seats.”
The crew of 175 has no way of knowing they are only moments away from also being hijacked.
By now, American 11 is crossing out of Boston’s airspace, and is bearing down on Bottiglia’s territory in New York. Within seconds the plane—or “target” as controllers call it— appears on his screen. Bottiglia: The controller right next to me gets up and walks over to me and he says, “You see this target here? He says, “This is American 11. Boston Center thinks it’s a hijack.” Brokaw: So what’d you think at that point? What was going through your mind? Bottiglia: I really thought they were probably going to Cuba. Brokaw: So you kept track of the target? Bottiglia: Kept track of the target. And now we of course we know he was descending at a rapid pace, but we had no altitude or anything on him.
Within minutes, American 11 simply disappears from radar.(Source)
- (8:42 - 8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Hijacking begins
All of these eyewitness accounts were provided via phone calls (as described below) from the back of the plane, even though the passengers calling had each been assigned a seat in the front or middle of the cabin.
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- (8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Transponder code changes
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But within seconds, Bottiglia has another unexpected problem. As he and other controllers search the radar, looking for American 11, he suddenly notices that United Flight 175, which moments ago helped him locate the hijacked plane, also has disappeared. Instinctively, Bottiglia knows the two are somehow related. He asks another controller to take over all of his other planes. Bottiglia: I think my voice was shaking, “Please just take everything and don’t ask any questions.”
He calls the United plane several times unsuccessfully, sharing the same anxiety his colleagues in Boston had felt only moments earlier.
Curt Applegate is working at the next radar bank in the New York center. Applegate: I could hear them talking behind me and and I realized he had two lost airplanes. That made me very nervous. Bottiglia: I know something bad’s happening. I really don’t know what. We had no transmissions from United. Applegate: When I turned back to look at the radar, there was a target right over Allentown. So I turned and yelled at Dave. I thought that was his American that he was looking for. Brokaw: But you, in fact are looking at the United flight?Applegate: But I was in fact looking at United, that’s correct.
A transponder signal quickly reappears on radar, somewhere near the New Jersey Pennsylvania border. A mistake , perhaps, on the part of the hijackers— the signal continues to transmit information to controllers. There no longer is any question in Bottiglia’s mind that he’s looking at a second hijacked airliner. Applegate: When I saw it, it was at 33,000. And as soon as I said that he started to turn to the left. And descending.
United 175 is no longer heading west as it should be. Instead, it has now also turned ominously toward the east, and New York City.
There are now two hijacked airliners in the skies over the East coast—the first, American 11, has already disappeared from radar. Controllers don’t know where it is. The second is United 175, now over northern New Jersey suburbs.(Source)
- (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: WTC fire reported to ATC
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- (8:51 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Altitude change
- (8:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Calls report hijacking on Flight 175
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Beginning at 8:52 A.M. and continuing until 8:59 A.M., a passenger unsuccessfully tried a total of four times to reach his wife on both her business and home phone lines.
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- (8:53 - 9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD fighter scrambled
The rest of the country, watching on television, still believes the crash in New York is an accident. But these controllers, now watching in horror as the second plane bears down on lower Manhattan, are the first to know the awful truth.
Curt Applegate: We know he’s gonna crash. That’s pretty much a given. We don’t know where he’s gonna crash.
Mark Dipalmo: I think we all knew something was going to happen, be it the Statue of Liberty, the Empire State Building.
John Smith: It was highlighted to me so that I could watch it as it came in from the southwest and then made a direct turn towards the south tower.
Brokaw: When it made that direct turn did you think, “Oh, my God?”
Smith: I thought it was a fighter jet coming in to cover the city. And it turned out he continued to descend down through 5000 feet and lower...
Jeffroy: And that’s when my supervisor came up and said, “You know, you could probably consider him a terrorist at this point.” And you kind of just turn around and got this kinda empty feeling.
Brokaw: It was helpless. You couldn’t do anything.
Jeffroy: Yeah. You know, you sit there for ten years controlling planes. For the first time in your life you don’t have any control of this at all.
At Newark tower, Bob Varcadapane is still on the phone with a controller at the New York center, and learns that a second plane has been hijacked and is almost on top of Manhattan.
Varcadapane: He says to me, “As a matter of fact, you see that target coming over the Verrazano Bridge.” I went over to the radar and looked at the radar. The Verrazano Bridge is depicted on the radar. And I looked over there and I saw the aircraft descending out of 4700 feet, 3600 feet, 2700 feet.
Greg Callahan: And I could hear him calling on altitudes. “I have a target in sight, he’s descending rapidly.” And he said—“Look out to the southeast,” and the gentleman working ground control said, “Hey, who’s that by the Verrazano Bridge?” And here comes a very large target descending rapidly, very fast.
Tepper: He was in a hard right bank, diving very steeply and very fast. And as was in he was coming up the Hudson River, he made another hard left turn and just heading for downtown Manhattan.
Varcadapane: It was fast.
Callahan: Very fast. He was moving fast.
Brokaw: Anybody in the room say anything at that point, or are you just transfixed by what you were seeing?
Callahan: Well, that pretty much confirmed all our worst fears if there’s anything in the back of your mind saying, “Maybe this just was something minor,” basically everyone—there was a moment of silence, and then things really started to move.
Tepper: You could see that he was trying to line himself up on the tower. And just before he hit the tower he almost leveled it out and just hit the building. And I’m still talking to the center at that time. And I just said “Oh, my God he just hit the World Trade Center.” And you could see him go in the side of the building and then you just saw the flames and explosion erupting out the other side of the building.
Brokaw: What was going on in this room at that time?
Varcadapane: There was disbelief. They couldn’t believe what we just saw.(Source)
- (8:55 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 175 suspected hijacked
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- (8:57 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 175 heads for New York
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- (8:58 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Hijack suspicions spread
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- (8:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Suspected hijacking reported to United Airlines Chicago
An employee at United's maintenance office in San Francisco sent three ACARS messages to Flight 175. Each read, "I heard of a reported incident aboard your acft [aircraft]. Plz verify all is normal."
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- (9:00 approx a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 175 missing from radar
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- (9:00 a.m.) September 11, 2001: More calls from the plane
Lee Hanson received a second call from his son who told him: It's getting bad, Dad—A stewardess was stabbed—They seem to have knives and Mace—They said they have a bomb—It's getting very bad on the plane—Passengers are throwing up and getting sick—The plane is making jerky movements—I don't think the pilot is flying the plan•I think we are going down—I think they intend to go to Chicago or someplace and fly into a building.
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- (9:01 / 9:02): New York Center report to the FAA
A manager from New York Center told the FAA Command Center: "We have several situations going on here. It's escalating big, big time. We need to get the military involved with us. . . . We're, we're involved with something else, we have other aircraft that may have a similar situation going on here. The "other aircraft" referred to by New York Center was Flight 175. The evidence suggests this conversation was the only notice received by either FAA headquarters or the Herndon Command Center prior to the second crash that there had been a second hijacking. While the Herndon Command Center was told about this "other aircraft" at 9:01 A.M., New York Center contacted New York terminal approach control and asked for assistance in locating Flight 175. At 9:02 A.M., as New York terminal approach controllers located Flight 175 rapidly descending into lower Manhattan, a New York Center manager stated, "[a]lright. Heads up man, it looks like another one coming in.
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<mp3>FAA on Flight 175 Approach.mp3|Download</mp3> - Discussions on the approach of Flight 175
- (9:02:57 / 9:03:11 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 175 crashes
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While the Commission recorded an impact time of 9:03:11, NIST used a time of 9:02:57 based on seismic records. The difference has been used to suggest the seismic readings actually recorded a pre-impact explosion in the basement, however that doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Read more here.
- (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS receive notification of a second possible hijack
Ballinger sent an ACARS message to the aircraft: "How is the ride. Anything dispatch can do for you." Another ACARS was sent at the same time by the UAL air traffic control coordinator: "NY approach lookin for ya on [frequency] 127.4.
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- (9:03:22 a.m.) September 11, 2001: A crash at the WTC is confirmed
Shortly after, unaware that Flight 175 had flown into the World Trade Center, Ballinger again attempted to communicate with the aircraft. He sent the same ACARS message: "How is the ride. Anything dispatch can do for you." Meanwhile, the airline's air traffic control coordinator re-sent his ACARS message, "NY approach lookin for ya on 127.4."
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- (9:04 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center stops departures
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- (9:04 - 9:07 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS request information on Flight 175
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- (9:05 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Suspicion of multiple hijacks
New York Center declared "ATC zero"—meaning that aircraft were not permitted to depart from, arrive at, or travel through New York Center's airspace until further notice.
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- (9:07 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Aircraft alerted to heighten security
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- (9:08 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS learns of the second WTC explosion
This is what I foresee that we probably need to do. We need to talk to FAA. We need to tell 'em if this stuff is gonna keep on going, we need to take those fighters, put 'em over Manhattan. That's best thing, that's the best play right now. So coordinate with the FAA. Tell 'em if there's more out there, which we don't know, let's get 'em over Manhattan. At least we got some kind of play.
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<mp3>NEADS on fighters over NY.mp3|download</mp3>- NEADS mission crew commander
- (9:09 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley fighters ordered to battle stations
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- (9:09 - 9:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center warns aircraft within its region
A UAL dispatch operations shift manager's timeline log entry noted, "At that point a second aircraft had hit the WTC, but we didn't know it was our United flight."
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- (9:10 - 9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United and American Airlines confer
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- (9:12 a.m.) September 11, 2001: United Airlines staff alerted
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- (9:13 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Otis fighters exit holding pattern
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- (9:15 a.m. approx) September 11, 2001: Request to alert aircraft nationwide
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- (9:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001: ACARS alerts sent
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- (9:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: UAL believe second crash was Flight 175
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- (9:22 a.m.) September 11, 2001: UAL crisis center activated
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- (9:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Cockpit intrusion warning sent to Flight 175
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- (9:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Fighter establish combat air patrol over Manhattan
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