American Airlines Flight 11 Timeline
Timeline
Page 1, Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
- (6:45 - 6:52 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Arrival at the airport
Page 1, Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
The call was placed from a pay phone in Terminal C (between the screening checkpoint and United 175’s boarding gate). We presume Shehhi made the call, but we cannot be sure. Logan International Airport site visit (Aug. 15, 2003); see also FBI response to Commission briefing request no. 6, undated (topic 11).
Footnote 3 to Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
- (6:45 - 7:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Check in and boarding the flight
Page 2, Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
- (7:31 - 7:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boarding
Page 2, Chapter 1
9/11 Commission Report
- (7:40/7:45 - 7:59 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 departs
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- (8:10 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 handed off to Boston Center ATC
More than 75 controllers are on duty at the time. Among them, Tom Roberts, Lino Martins, Don Jefroy, John Hartling, Pete Zalewski, and Mike Blake.
Within minutes, the 767 is climbing through 20,000 feet, and onto Pete Zalewski’s radar.(Source)
- (8:14 - 8:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: The latest regular communication from Flight 11
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- (8:14 - 8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: ATC try to figure out what's happening
Zalewski: I turn him to 20 degrees right, he took the turn. I then told American 11, “Climb and maintain flight level three-five-zero, 35,000 feet.” There was no response.
A moment of concern perhaps, but that was not uncommon. Zalewski: At that point, I was just thinking that it was, you know, maybe the pilots weren’t paying attention, or there’s something wrong with the frequency.
Zalewski followed procedures, continuing to try to raise American 11 on the frequency. Zalewski: And at first, it was pretty much, you know, American 11, you know, “Are you paying attention? Are you listening?” And there was still no response. I used the emergency frequency to try and get a hold of him through that. There was no response.
By now Zalewski is running a mental checklist, trying to account for the loss of communication — a technical problem or maybe a mistake on the pilot’s part? Zalewski: I went back the previous sector to see if the pilot had accidentally flipped the switch back over on the radio. At that point there was still nothing. We weren’t hearing from him.
American 11 was “NORDO”—“no radio contact.” Zalewski stepped up his efforts. Zalewski: I would go on to call that aircraft 12 times.
And as it went on, I begin to get more concerned. Brokaw: You’re watching American 11 at that point as well, Lino?Lino Martins: Yes. He was in my air space at that time.
Colleague Lino Martins, working nearby, is now also tracking the American Airlines plane. Lino Martins: I saw him start the right turns, figuring Pete was gonna climb him and that’s when Pete called. And said, “No, he’s staying at two-nine-zero, ‘cause he didn’t respond, he’s NORDO.” Zalewski: I said, “We’re not talking to him. And he was last assigned at 29, but he may have heard the 35. I’m not sure what he might do here, so just watch him.” Martins: At that point, again, I didn’t think anything was wrong.
But the second controller did have incoming flights directly in the path of American 11. Martins: I had to plan ahead on this new heading he was on. He was opposite direction with my Boston arrivals. And I had to get them underneath him.
But then, 8:20 a.m., American 11 abruptly changes course, turning to the northwest.[http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14754701/print/1/displaymode/1098/ (Source)
- (8:19 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Betty Ong's call talks of a hijacking
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The emergency call from Betty Ong lasted approximately 25 minutes (8:19 A.m.-8:44 A.M.). Ong relayed vital information about events taking place aboard the airplane to authorities on the ground. Her call was received initially at the reservations office by an American Airlines employee. The call was transferred to another employee who, realizing the urgency of the situation, pushed an emergency button that simultaneously initiated a tape recording of the call and sent an alarm notifying Nydia Gonzalez, the reservations office supervisor, to pick up on the line. Gonzalez was paged to respond to the alarm and joined the call a short time later. Only the first four minutes of the phone call between Ong and the reservations center was tape-recorded because the recently installed recording system at that time contained a default time limit.
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<mp3>Betty Ong Phone Call.mp3|download</mp3>- 4 minutes of Betty Ong's phone call
- (8:20 a.m.) September 11, 2001: More from Ong
As noted above, American Airlines flight attendants all carried cockpit keys on their person. Although no information was provided from the flight about exactly how the hijackers gained access to the cockpit, it is possible the stabbings of the flight attendants could have been for the purpose of acquiring a key, of forcing one of them to open the cockpit door, or of luring the captain or first officer out of the cockpit.
The American Airlines dispatcher at the airline's operations center in Texas who was responsible for transatlantic flights received a communication from an American Airlines flight traveling from Seattle to Boston that air traffic control had asked the aircraft to try to contact Flight 11. This was the first indication she had of any problem on the flight.(Source)
- (8:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: The transponder is turned off
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Every commercial airplane is equipped with a transponder that transmits a constant signal. The signal gives controllers on the ground a steady flow of information—displayed on radar screens in a “datablock” such as this one. Think of it as the airplane’s vital signs containing the carrier, flight number, speed and altitude. If the transponder’s not working, the plane is simply blip on radar. Controllers can see only the location, and the speed of the plane. Zalewski: And so, I very quietly turned to the supervisor and I said, “Would you please come over here?” I said, “I think something is seriously wrong with this plane.” Brokaw: Did you suspect hijacking at that point?Zalewski: Absolutely not. No way.
American 11 has been NORDO for six minutes, and now other controllers are becoming concerned. Tom Roberts tries yet another method to contact the plane. Tom Roberts: I happened to be working on another American flight on my frequency. One of our procedures or protocols is to go aircraft to aircraft on a company frequency, to see if the pilots from one flight could talk to the pilots of another flight.
But that too, fails. There is still no reply — the silence increasingly ominous as the jet, now drastically off course, flying in a northwesterly direction, toward Albany, New York. Controllers are scrambling to keep create a safe zone around the runaway plane, moving every other flight in the area out of the way, from the ground, all the way up to 35,000 feet.
Roberts: We had pretty much moved all the airplanes from Albany to New York to Syracuse, New York out of the way because that’s the track he was going on.Martins: And I didn’t know if he was gonna turn back on course...Roberts: And we had no altitude information. So, it’s not just clearing the altitudes of conflicting traffic...Martins: It was that whole altitude stratum from the ground, up to 35,000.(Source)
- (8:22 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Ong provides more information
Also at 8:22 A.M., flight attendant Madeline "Amy" Sweeney tried to contact the American Airlines flight services office at Logan International Airport by air phone. The office she was attempting to call managed the scheduling and operation of flight attendants, and its phone number was well known to the American flight attendants operating out of Boston.59 Sweeney's initial attempt to get through to the office failed.
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- (8:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines sent a text message to the cockpit
Also at 8:23 A.M., the tape recording of the call between Ong and the reservations center ceased because of the default time limit on the system. However, Gonzalez remained on the line with Ong for the next 21 minutes. Gonzalez continued to report the information she received from the flight attendant to the American Airlines SOC. The call between American's reservations facility and the SOC continued to be taped by the SOC until its conclusion.
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- (8:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center hear Mohamed Atta
<mp3>We have some planes.mp3|download</mp3>- Atta's voice from the Flight 11 cockpit
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Zalewski: And that’s when I heard the first transmission from the aircraft. And I wasn’t quite sure what it was. Because it was just a foreign voice. It was something very different. To me, it sounded almost Middle Eastern. And I asked, “American 11, is that you? American 11, are you trying to call me?” And then came the next transmission. And in that transmission, I immediately knew something was very wrong. And I knew it was a hijack.Brokaw: And what did you hear?Zalewski: I remember the part of them saying they were going back to the airport. And by that, I deduced that they were going to go back to Boston. That’s what I was thinking. And I didn’t believe it was one of the American pilots on board. I immediately stood up and yelled at the supervisor, “John, get over here immediately right now.” And I can just remember everybody in that building, and they were all just looking at me, like, “What is wrong with you?”
Zalewski cannot make out exactly what the hijackers are saying, but the tone of their voices alone, chills him. Zalewski: I felt from those voices the terror. For some reason, I knew something seemed worse than just a normal hijack. It just seemed very different to me.
Zalewski immediately asks for an assistant, to help listen to the transmissions coming from the plane and puts the frequency on a speaker so others can hear. And, he notifies the supervisor there is a hijacking—the first one on a U.S. carrier in more than a decade.[http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14754701/print/1/displaymode/1098/ (Source)
- (8:24 - 8:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center raises the alert
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- (8:25 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Madeline Sweeney calls with more information
At the same time, Sweeney's third call to the American Airlines Flight Services Office at Boston finally was connected to an American Airlines' employee. Sweeney told her that someone was hurt aboard Flight 12, and then the phone call was cut off. The recipient of the call passed the information to Michael Woodward, the flight service manager. Woodward went to American's gate area at Logan with a colleague. The supervisor noted that the morning flights had all departed Boston and the gate area was quiet. He further realized that Flight 12 was a flight to Boston from the West Coast that had not even left yet, so he and his colleague returned to the office to try to clarify the nature of the emergency call.
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- (8:26 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 "flying erratically"
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- (8:28 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center alerts the FAA
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- (8:29 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Anerican Airlines check with Boston Center
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- (8:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 changes direction
Pete Zalewski: Then comes a third transmission from the aircraft. And that one was pretty horrifying.
Zalewski, concerned he might be missing vital information, asks the supervisor to have someone pull the transmission tapes that are automatically recorded, right away. Zalewski: And thankfully, they did pull the tapes. And a part that I didn’t hear which was, “We have more planes,” or something to that effect. And that really was a key statement. Don Jeffroy: I’ve heard a number of different tapes in the past of aircraft crashes—and this was in my mind the worst. I’d never heard something like that.Tom Brokaw, NBC News: Was it just cold blooded? Jeffroy: It made you actually step up and think: What did he mean, what’s going on? What's next?
The voice they’re most likely hearing is that of Mohammed Atta, who would later come to be known as the mastermind of the terrorist attacks. Controllers believe the hijackers mean to speak to the passengers, mistakenly, keying the mike to air traffic control, and Pete Zalewski instead.
By now American 11 had crossed into airspace John Hartling controls.(Source)
- (After 8:30, before 8:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines begin their emegency procedures
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- (8:31 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center provide more data
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- (8:32 a.m.) September 11, 2001: FAA discuss the hijacking
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The phone call between Sweeney and Woodward lasted approximately 12 minutes. It was not taped. According to Woodward, Sweeney was calm and collected. She provided the following information: she was sitting in the back of the aircraft next to Betty Ong; the plane had been hijacked; a man in first class had had his throat slashed; two flight attendants had been stabbed—one flight attendant had been stabbed seriously and was on oxygen while another flight attendant's wounds were not as serious and seemed to be okay; a doctor had been paged; the fli ht attendants were unable to contact the cockpit; and there was a bomb in the cockpit.
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- (8:33 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines HQ now suspect a hijacking
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- (8:34 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center look for fighter support
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- (8:35 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Information from Ong is passed up the line
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- (8:36 a.m.) September 11, 2001: American Airlines invoke emergency procedures
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- (8:37 - 8:38 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 in rapid descent
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- (8:37:52 a.m. and later) September 11, 2001: Boston Center informs NORAD about the hijacking
The report of the hijack was relayed immediately to Battle Commander Colonel Robert Marr at NEADS, who was stationed in the Battle Cab in preparation for a scheduled NORAD exercise. Col. Marr confirmed that the hijacking was "real-world" then ordered fighter pilots at Otis Air Force Base in Massachusetts to battle-stations.
Col. Marr then phoned Maj. General Larry Arnold, commanding General of the First Air Force and the Continental U.S. NORAD Region (CONR) commander. Col. Man advised him of the situation, and sought authorization to scramble the Otis fighters in response to the reported hijacking. General Arnold instructed Col. Marr "to go ahead and scramble the airplanes and we'd get permission later. And the reason for that is that the procedure... if you follow the book, is they [law enforcement officials] go to the duty officer of the national military center, who in turn makes an inquiry to NORAD for the availability of fighters, who then gets permission from someone representing the Secretary of Defense. Once that is approved then we scramble an aircraft. We didn't wait for that." General Arnold then picked up the phone and talked to the operations deputy at NORAD, who told him 'Yeah, we'll work with the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Go ahead and scramble the aircraft.'"(Source)
<mp3>FAA talk to NEADS re AA11.mp3|download</mp3>- NEADs are informed about the hijacking of Flight 11
- (8:40 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS place fighters on battle stations
Also at 8:40 A.M., information about Flight 11 started to be conveyed within the Air Traffic Control system. Boston Center, through the Herndon Command Center, provided a report to New York TRACON on Flight 11.
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- (8:41 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 closes in on New York
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Dave Bottiglia: The first thing he said to me was, “We heard threatening transmissions being broadcast by the American.”
The pilots of the United flight have monitored a transmission from the hijacked plane, repeating to Bottiglia what they overhead in the American cockpit. Bottiglia: And his exact words were, “Everyone, stay in your seats.”
The crew of 175 has no way of knowing they are only moments away from also being hijacked.
By now, American 11 is crossing out of Boston’s airspace, and is bearing down on Bottiglia’s territory in New York. Within seconds the plane—or “target” as controllers call it— appears on his screen. Bottiglia: The controller right next to me gets up and walks over to me and he says, “You see this target here? He says, “This is American 11. Boston Center thinks it’s a hijack.” Brokaw: So what’d you think at that point? What was going through your mind? Bottiglia: I really thought they were probably going to Cuba. Brokaw: So you kept track of the target? Bottiglia: Kept track of the target. And now we of course we know he was descending at a rapid pace, but we had no altitude or anything on him.
Within minutes, American 11 simply disappears from radar.(Source)
- (8:43 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Washington warned about Flight 11
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- (8:44 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Calls terminate
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- (8:45 a.m.) September 11, 2001: The FBI are informed
Also at 8:45 A.M., the American Airlines director of security learned of the hijacking. He contacted the special agent in charge of the FBI's Dallas Field Office to tell him that a hijacking was taking place
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- (8:46 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 crashes into WTC1
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While the Commission recorded an impact time of 8:46:40, NIST used a time of 8:46:29 based on seismic records. The difference has been used to suggest the seismic readings actually recorded a pre-impact explosion in the basement, however that doesn't stand up to scrutiny. Read more here.
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- Impact time and after, September 11, 2001: Eye witnesses
Aviles worked for the Port Authority. He dialed five numbers, leaving identical messages, describing what he saw, and telling everyone up the chain of command to begin the evacuation. He called one colleague, John Paczkowski, but reached his voice mail. "It seems to be an American Airlines jetliner came in from the northern direction, toward-from the Empire State Building, toward us," Aviles said. He ticked through a list of notifications-he had called the police and the public affairs office, and had beeped the chief operating officer for the agency. "Smoke is beginning to come, so I think I'm gonna start bailing outta here, man.... Don't come near the building if you're outside. Pieces are coming down, man. Bye." ...
In the police bureau at the base, Alan Reiss heard talk of a missile having been fired from the roof of the Woolworth Building, just a couple of blocks east of the trade center.
As Reiss was listening to this, a Port Authority detective, Richie Paugh, arrived.
"We're going out onto the plaza to let you know what's going on," Reiss told the desk. He and Paugh walked down the hallway from the plaza, past an airline ticket counter. A revolving door put them under a soffit, an overhang sheltering the entrance to 5 World Trade Center. They peered out. Debris had rained onto the plaza-steel and concrete and fragments of offices and glass. Above them, they could see the east side of the north tower, and also its northern face. Instead of the waffle gridding of the building's face, they now saw a wall of fire spread across ten or fifteen floors. Then they saw the people coming out the windows, driven toward air, and into air. The plane had struck not two minutes earlier.
On the ground, they saw an odd shape. Reiss looked closer. It was the nose gear of an airplane, missing the rubber tire, but with its wheel still connected to the hydraulic elbow that retracts into the bottom of the plane. Paugh began to take notes on its shape and location. Reiss protested. "There's crap falling on us," he said. "I don't have a hard hat on or anything, let's just drag it in."
He and Paugh lugged the part into the police office. "It's evidence, put a sticker on it," Reiss said.
"A plane hit the building," Paugh said.
"It's a big plane," Reiss added. "It's not a Piper Cub. This is a bi-i-i-g fucking wheel."102 Minutes, by Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn
- (8:50 a.m.) September 11, 2001: A crash is reported to American HQ
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- (8:53 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NORAD unaware of the crash
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- (9:03 a.m.) September 11, 2001: "We have some planes"
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<mp3>FAA on We Have No Planes.MP3|download</mp3>- The "we have some planes" transmission is discussed
- (9:16 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Flight 11 is suspect for the first crash
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- (9:21 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Boston Center say Flight 11 is still airborne
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The Command Center advised the Dulles terminal control facility, which urged its controllers to search for the craft. The military's NORAD (North American Air Defense Command) did not know about the search for American 77. Instead, it heard once again about a plane that no longer existed, American 11. NEADS (the Northeast Air Defense Sector) received a report from the FAA around 9:21:
FAA: Military, Boston Center. I just had a report that American 11 is still in the air, and it's on its way towards -- heading towards Washington.
NEADS: OK. American 11 is still in the air?
FAA: Yes.
NEADS: On its way towards Washington?
FAA: That was another -- it was evidently another aircraft that hit the tower.
That's the latest report we have.
NEADS: OK.
FAA: I'm going to try to confirm an ID for you, but I would assume he's somewhere over, uh, either New Jersey or somewhere further south.
NEADS: OK. So American 11 isn't the hijack at all then, right?
FAA: No, he is a hijack.
NEADS: He -- American 11 is a hijack?
FAA:Yes.
NEADS: And he's heading into Washington?
FAA: Yes. This could be a third aircraft.
The mention of a "third aircraft" was not a reference to American 77. There was confusion at that moment in the FAA. Two planes had struck the World Trade Center, and Boston Center had heard from FAA headquarters in Washington that American 11 was still airborne.
The NEADS technician who took this call from the FAA immediately passed the word to the Mission Crew Commander. He reported to the NEADS Battle Commander:
Mission Crew Commander, NEADS: OK, uh, American Airlines is still airborne. Eleven, the first guy, he’s heading towards Washington. OK? I think we need to scramble Langley right now. And I'm gonna take the fighters from Otis, try to chase this guy down if I can find him.http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=1962742
<mp3>FAA AA11 still airborne.mp3|download</mp3>- FAA say Flight 11 is still airborne
<mp3>NEADS scramble re phantom AA11.mp3|download</mp3>- NEADS response
- (9:23 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS order Langley fighters scrambled
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- (9:24 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Scramble order is processed
Shortly after 9:24 A.M., out of concern over leaving New York's airspace unprotected, NEADS commanders decided to cancel the plan to pursue Flight 11 with the Otis fighters.
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- (9:27 a.m.) September 11, 2001: NEADS unsure about Flight 11 status
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- (9:30 a.m.) September 11, 2001: Langley fighters airborne
By 9:30 A.M. , American Airlines confirmed that Flight 11 had crashed into the World Trade Center.
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