It's October the 8th, 2001, and General Mahmoud Ahmad, chief of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has just been dismissed. Could this be part of a coverup, to avoid investigation into claims that he had helped fund the 9/11 attacks?
Here's what Nafeez Ahmed said about this in his book, “The War On Truth”:
There are several points worth discussing here, but perhaps the core one is why Ahmad lost his job in the first place. Nafeez Ahmed suggests it may be to cover up links with the US; the opposing view could be that he was too close to the Taliban, radical Islamic groups, and al Qaeda (if the wire transfer claims are true), and getting rid of him was part of an attempt to “de-radicalize the Pakistani regime”. And we would argue that it’s the latter interpretation that makes considerably more sense.
The first problem with arguing that Ahmad lost his job to avoid any investigations into him over 9/11 links, for instance, is that this ignores other reasons that may have been more significant.
Here it’s claimed he had “his own radical Islamic agenda”, disobeyed Musharraf when visiting Afghanistan, and told Mullah Omar to resist. Another article suggests that resistance took a very practical form:
It’s hard to see how limiting the damage from American aerial bombing actually benefited the US, but it certainly fits if Ahmed was simply pursuing “his own radical Islamic agenda”.
Another story offers some confirmation that the trip to Afghanistan, and what happened there, played a major part in Ahmed’s eventual downfall:
And an Indian report discusses further reasons given in Pakistan as to why Ahmed may have been fired:
ISLAMABAD, OCT. 10. Was the decision of the Pakistan President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, to replace the chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence, Lt.Gen. Mehmood Ahmed, amid the fast-changing scenario in the wake of the September 11 attacks, a routine change or was it something more serious?
Gen. Musharraf sought to explain the replacement that coincided with the first air raids by the U.S. and U.K. forces on Afghanistan as a matter unrelated to Afghanistan but doubts persisted.
The English daily, The News, in a front-page report today sought to establish that the transfer of the ``super spymaster was very much related to the Kabul developments. Among other things, it charged the former ISI chief, with effectively preventing Gen. Musharraf from interacting with the top brass of the Taliban in the last several months.
The paper said that Lt.Gen. Ahmed became a victim of `over- ambition'. He was accused of trying to `outmanoeuvre' his seniors to grab the number two slot in the Army and prevented, Gen. Musharraf from visiting Kandahar to prevail on the Taliban chief, Mullah Omar, to close down Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda camps.
On his return home from the U.S. last month, he is said to have `misbehaved' with almost all the key military and civil aides to Gen. Musharraf. Lt.Gen. Ahmed was on an official visit during the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. He stayed on to interact with U.S. officials to discuss the crackdown on the Taliban.
He also refused to accept Gen. Musharraf's offer to become the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and tried to influence the President to change his mind through common friends.
Quoting sources, the paper said that Lt.Gen. Ahmed, opposed Gen. Musharraf's Kandahar visit by arguing that the President should travel to Kandahar only after the ISI had prepared the ground for him. He persuaded the President to approve the visit of Interior Minister, Lt.Gen. (retd.) Moinuddin Haider, to meet Mulla Omar. Lt.Gen. Haider's meeting however did not yield many results.
Lt.Gen. Ahmed was considered close to Gen. Musharraf when he arrested the then Prime Minister, Mr. Nawaz Sharif. Along with Lt.Gen. Ahmed, Gen. Muzzafar Hussain Usmani, Deputy Chief of the Army, who played a key role in the military coup was also sidelined. Both are reported to have sought premature retirement as a mark of protest.
In a related development the Pakistan Foreign Office has denied reports circulated by an Indian news agency that the former ISI chief was linked with a militant [Saeed Shikh] released by the Indian Government in exchange for the freedom of the passengers on board the Indian Airlines flight from Kathmandu in December 1999.
http://www.hinduonnet.com/2001/10/11/stories/0311000j.htm
It could be argued that these briefings were simply an attempt to cover up the truth, and certainly if you believe Mahmoud Ahmed really was linked to Sheikh then the last paragraph denial won’t convince you.
There is another interesting detail here, though, that goes against the idea of the general losing his ISI job solely to avoid discussion of 9/11 links: “Gen. Muzzafar Hussain Usmani, Deputy Chief of the Army, who played a key role in the military coup was also sidelined”. So why him as well?
It seems both Usmani and Ahmed didn’t want to support war against the Taliban, along with a couple of other generals. And so they were all removed. This is entirely consistant with Musharraf getting rid of people who pursue their “own radical Islamic agenda”, but something of a problem if you believe only Ahmed needed to be removed for an entirely different reason.
A further Guardian story offered more information:
According to this report, then, the two demoted generals were “regarded as hardline Islamists”. And the author sees the reshuffle as making it harder “for rightwing fundamentalist officers, who form a significant faction within Pakistan's powerful army, to topple Gen Musharraf in a counter-coup”. Again, very good reasons for removing Ahmed and the others, without resorting to special fears over links to Saeed Sheikh or the funding of 9/11.
An Indian report in The Hindu produced a similar analysis:
Copyright 2001 FT Asia Africa Intelligence Wire
All rights reserved
Copyright 2001 The Hindu
THE HINDU
October 9, 2001
LENGTH: 477 words
HEADLINE: India: Musharraf brings moderates to the fore
BODY:
NEW DELHI, OCT. 8. In removing the present ISI chief and shifting the corp commander in Lahore, Pakistan's President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has taken a big risk in consolidating his hold over the military.
This move could backfire in the long-run as Punjabis, who have been the anchor of the Pakistani military, are no longer represented in the army top brass, Government sources here said. On the contrary, Gen. Musharraf's gambit could payoff in case he manages to steer the transition in the Pakistan's military and politics successfully after fine-tuning the new setup.
In a late night decision on Sunday, Gen. Musharraf removed Lt. General Mehmood Ahmad as chief of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence and replaced him with Lt. Gen. Ehsanul Haq, corp commander of Peshawar. He also moved Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz, his right hand man both during the Kargil war and in engineering the military coup which brought him to power. Lt. Gen. Muzaffar Hussein Usmani, who also played a key role in bringing Gen. Musharraf to power has sought "premature retirement". These changes are highly significant as political power in Pakistan has traditionally rested with the Chief of Army Staff and his top corp commanders.
Government sources here say that Gen. Musharraf has sought to rid his team of corps commanders of "hardliners" who have reportedly opposed him in the recent past and are known to be sympathisers of radical Islamic groups. Instead, he has sought to cobble together a more "moderate" elite around him, presumably to push forward Pakistan's new pro-Western Afghan policy. But this effort to bring moderates to the fore may backfire as it could, notwithstanding the professionalism in the Pakistani military, alienate the powerful lobby of Punjabi officers.
The shifting of Lt. Gen. Aziz especially is likely to be unpopular within the Pakistani military establishment as he has had a reputation of being an influential officer. Besides, his movement away from Lahore, the very heart of Punjab, may not also be liked.
Sources point out that the decision on shifting Lt. Gen. Aziz is also likely to be linked to an anticipation of religious unrest in Punjab following U.S. and British air strikes on Afghanistan. Analysts here point out that Gen. Musharraf can live with demonstrations of religious extremism in the border provinces of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, but can ill-afford widespread unrest in Punjab.
Not surprisingly, he badly needs a "loyalist" in Punjab who can speedily execute hard decisions, if required.
Sources clarified that Gen. Musharraf's decision to change the complexion of the Pakistani military must have been taken in "consultation" with the U.S. and Britain.
Consequently, considerable importance is being attached here to the Blair mission to Islamabad last week.
Musharraf went much further then removing just one or two senior generals, though:
This appears to have been a major clearout. Why is it a surprise that Mahmoud Ahmad was caught up in it? Why is it more likely that he was removed to avoid investigation into 9/11 links, than simply for his opposition to Musharraf’s support for the US? And why is it that Nafeez Ahmed, in his quote at the top of the page, appears to ignore all of this?
Ahmed also complains that “the US has refused to launch an investigation of wider ISI complicity”. When did this refusal happen? Is Ahmed aware of all the US investigations into this area? We’re not saying “trust that the government have investigated it”, just that we don’t know what the situation is, and to say that they have “refused” to launch an investigation is misleading. (Unless, of course, he has evidence to back that up.)
As for the “deafening silence” on Mahmoud Ahmed and Sheikh, the comparison made with suspects in Germany is particularly inappropriate. Issuing warrants for the arrest of ordinary citizens living in Germany poses no problems at all. Issuing a warrant for the arrest of a high-level military official (even a former one), in a country where there’s far more hostility to you, and is of more strategic importance, is plainly going to be very much more difficult. Does anyone seriously believe that Musharraf would allow Mahmoud Ahmed to be extradited to the US? Or even could allow such a thing? There’s a sizeable chunk of the population that wouldn’t stand for that, and many in the army who would feel the same way.
The “silence” on Sheikh isn’t quite as deafening as Nafeez Ahmed would have you believe, either. Accounts from 2002 suggest the US had indicted Sheikh for his 1994 kidnapping, and approached Pakistan to explore the possibility of extradition:
Of course years later he’s still in a Pakistan jail, as the appeal process grinds on. Is this the fault of US inaction? Not according to this report from India:
There was little sympathy here for British national Omar Saeed Sheikh after he was given the death sentence for the murder of reporter Daniel Pearl in Pakistan today.
But the British government was forced into opposing the sentence. British law does not permit capital punishment, and the country is bound by its constitution to oppose the passing of a death sentence anywhere in the world. The Foreign Office, accordingly, sent in a protest over the death sentence.
Britain-born Sheikh, who was convicted Monday of murdering Wall Street Journal reporter Pearl in January, has earned anything but sympathy here. There was little sign of any opposition within the media or in the public to the order against him.
Both Britain and the U.S.A have opposed the death sentence, although for different reasons. The U.S. authorities want Sheikh alive, and in their hands, to interrogate him over links with Al- Qaida. U.S. officials fear that if he is executed, invaluable knowledge about the terrorist network will die with him.
The U.S. fears that Pakistan wants him executed in order to hide his links with the Inter-Services Intelligence. They believe the interrogation of Sheikh could also lead to groups that are planning attacks in the U.S.A Britain and India.
The British government has sought the permission of the Pakistani authorities to interrogate Sheikh. But with such permission denied even to the U.S.A it was never likely that the British police would be given access to him even though Sheikh is a British citizen.
London is reported to have informally asked for the extradition of Sheikh to Britain. But Pakistan has refused. The membership of the Commonwealth gives the British Government a legal basis to ask for the extradition. But given its partial suspension from the Commonwealth, the British Government has found itself without a legal base to seek the extradition.
As for the U.S. demand for his extradition, according to The Times, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf reportedly told a close aide: “I’d rather hang him myself than hand him over.”
A death sentence on Sheikh cuts off possible links to several networks of young Islamist groups in Britain. Many among them have boasted openly that they have been volunteering to join terrorist camps in Pakistan and the West Asia.
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2002/20020716/world.htm
If we are to believe this, the US wants to interrogate Sheikh but haven’t been allowed to do so. Meanwhile the lengthy appeal process gives Pakistan an excuse to hold on to him, and even when that’s complete, the “I’d rather hang him myself” comment suggests Sheikh may not be going anywhere. And if that’s how Musharraf responds to the idea of extraditing Sheikh, you can only imagine what he’d say about handing over Mahmoud Ahmad.
To sum up, then, Mahmoud Ahmad was dismissed as part of a major purge of hardline Islamist elements in the ISI and Pakistani army. It could be argued that he would have lost his job for the alleged connection to funding 9/11, too, but that hasn’t been proved. And even if it were, it’s still not evidence that this was done to avoid investigations that might uncover American hands behind the whole affair. It could just as easily be that the US knew this was the only action they’d ever be allowed to take against him; Musharraf would never allow him to be extradited, or even questioned, so having him removed from power was the only significant option available.